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FICTIONAL PERSONA TEST:
COPYRIGHT
PREEMPTION IN HUMAN
AUDIOVISUAL

CHARACTERS*

Norm Peterson... may be the funniest fat man since Oliver
Hardy, but it isn't just his fat that's funny. It's his fate. To the
delight of Cheers addicts, he makes a dreary, beery profession of
depression.... If there's anything Norm hates worse than his
job, it's his wife.... Every night he bellies up to the bar, at home
beside the foam, and takes notes on what fools these mortals be:
"Some people spend their whole life in a bar. One poor shmo
came in yesterday, sat right next to me for eleven hours." But
hops spring eternal. After eight years of wishful drinking, Norm
has at lastfound his dream job: beer taster in a brewery.'
INTRODUCTION

When actors portray fictional characters on television or in a
movie, actors not only display their own physical appearance, but
also bring to life the personality traits and mannerisms that make
up the characters created by writers.2 While actors have a strong
interest in protecting their professional images from unauthorized
commercial exploitation,' producers (through contractual or workmade-for-hire4 arrangements with writers) have an equally strong
interest in protecting their own property-their fictional characters.5 Because of these two competing interests, tension arises
* An earlier version of this Note received First Prize in the 1998 Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, sponsored by the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).
1 Brad Darrach, After 11 Seasons, 274 Episodes and a Record 111 Emmy Nominations,
It's Closing Time, LIFE, May 1993, at 48, 60.
2 See Stephen Clark, Of Mice, Men and Supermen: The Copyrightability of Graphic
and Literary Characters,28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 959, 961 (1984) ("[Pjersonality traits and
mannerisms ... could be said to make up the characters underlying the graphics.").
3 See discussion infra Part I.
4 See discussion infra notes accompanying text 242-48.
5 See discussion infra Part III.B. For excellent discussions of copyright in characters,
see

generally

DOROTHY

J.

HOWELL,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTIES

AND

THE

PROTECTION OF FICTIONAL CHARACTERS (1990); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Le-

gal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429 [hereinafter Kurtz, Independent
Legal Lives]; Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Copyright + Character = Catastrophe, 39 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 303 (1992); Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as
Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional
Literary and PictorialCharacters,44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
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when producers use audiovisual characters 6 without the actors'
7
consent.

Such tension is magnified exponentially by the increasing use
of character merchandising,' a marketing technique by which
products are associated with well-known characters.' Since such
association effectively enhances the commercial value of the products,10 character merchandising has not only become a "wellknown feature of modern marketing"'" but has also grown into "a
multi-billion dollar business.' 2 Today, it is not unusual to find
6 Audiovisual charactersare fictional characters that exist in audiovisual works, which
are defined as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to
be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definitions). Examples include characters that appear on television or in a movie.
7 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Wendt 1]; see also Daniel Margolis, Cheers to the
Church Lady: Resolving the Conflict Between Copyright and the Right of Publicity, 1996
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 627, 632 ("[T]hese two values clash when the actor and studio claim
competing interests in controlling the use of a motion picture character.").
8 See JOANNA R. JEREMIAH, MERCHANDISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

4 (1997).
9 See id. ("[Character merchandising is a] marketing technique by which an advertiser
associates a product with a desirable personality or fictional character 'in whose reflected
light [the product] will appear more pleasing."' (quoting Shoshana Pty Ltd. v. 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd. (1987) 79 A.L.R. 279 (Austl.))).
10 See id. at 3 ("The aim of using a well-known character is clearly to enhance the
commercial value of the product. The product is enhanced by making it more eyecatching, glamorous, fun, or even through an implied statement about quality control or
other endorsement by the character or personality of the product itself."); see also IAIN
RAMSAY, ADVERTISING, CULTURE AND THE LAW:

BEYOND LIES, IGNORANCE AND

MANIPULATION 30-38 (1996) (discussing whether advertising and images manipulate consumers' preferences); Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends in the
Law of Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and Nontraditional
Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 603 (1991) ("Endorsement advertisements are most effective when the consumer identifies with the endorser because of perceived similarities between himself and the endorser, or when the
consumer believes what the endorser says either because the endorser is perceived to be
personally credible or is perceived to be an expert.").
11 JEREMIAH, supra note 8, at 4.
12 Id. at 3. The following data illustrates this point well:
Licensing fictional characters and selling products featuring these characters generates billions of dollars a year. For example, the 1990 movie Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles, based on characters first appearing in a 1984 comic book,
grossed approximately $25.4 million in its first weekend at the box office, while
licensing of the characters brought in $175 million in 1988 and $350 million in
1989. The 1989 movie Batman, based on Bob Kane's 1940s "Dark Knight"
crime fighter, grossed over $251 million in 1989, and its spin-offs have sold more
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products featuring popular characters from successful motion pictures or television series. 3
Because of the enormous economic potential of a fictional
character 1 4 anyone who is in a position to profit from its exploitation is eager to assert control over its commercial use."
For example, in Wendt v. Host International,Inc.,6 the actors
from the Cheers television series sued a chain of Cheers-themed
restaurants over the use of the "Norm" and "Cliff" characters
from the series.17 The actors claimed that their likenesses, which
than $500 million. The characters from Fox Television's prime time animated
comedy series The Simpsons, premiering in 1989, were worth millions within
months of the series's introduction.
Helfand, supra note 5, at 626 (footnotes omitted); see also Marshall Leaffer, Character
Merchandisingin the U.K., a Nostalgic Look, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 453,
453 (1994) ("No one who follows the media today will fail to realize that character merchandising is an ever-expanding multibillion dollar business."); John Berlau, Who Receives
the Big Bucks from Big Bird and Barney?, WASH. TIMES, June 2,1997, at 13, 13 ("Sesame
Street products ... gross over $800 million in retail sales around the world each year.");
Elizabeth Lesly Stevens & Ronald Grover, The Entertainment Glut, BUS. WK., Feb. 16,
1998, at 88 (stating that Lion King merchandise grossed roughly $3 billion).
13 Examples of these products include toys, mugs, food, key chains, posters, and Tshirts. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, No. 82-4892-AAH (Bx), 1982 WL
1279, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1982) (E.T dolls); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of
Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Star Wars dolls); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (Draculamerchandise); see also J.A.R. Sales,
1982 WL 1279, at *5 ("It is common practice in the entertainment industry to exploit
commercially the popularity of well-known motion picture and television personalities and
characters in connection with a wide range of merchandise, and the public has come to
expect such exploitation."); Kristen Baldwin, Full Steam Ahead, ENT. WKLY., Mar. 6,
1998, at 9, 9 ("[Titanic merchandise includes] auctioned memorabilia, official tie-in products sold by the J. Peterman catalog, and actual lumps of the ship's coal from RMS Titanic.").
14 See Phillip Edward Page, Licensing and Merchandising of Characters: Art Law
Topic for AALS 1994, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 421, 422 (1994) ("The increased ability to manufacture and market products bearing a character's image makes a
character a more valuable commodity."); Margolis, supra note 7, at 627 ("[Tjhose in the
entertainment industry see [identifiable characters] as the harbingers of colossal revenues."); id. at 628 ("Proprietary rights in characters ... may have tremendous value.").
IS See JEREMIAH, supra note 8, at 4; Leslie A. Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor: When
CharactersOutlive Their Copyrights, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437, 437 (1994)
[hereinafter Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor] ("Such characters tend to have great value,
and those who have owned them will wish to protect these creations from use by others.");
Margolis, supra note 7, at 627-28 ("The key to... revenues ... belongs to whoever controls the use of these characters."); see also AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, M.P., SEVEN
LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 17 (Rothman Reprints
1971) (1899) ("[T]he essence of Property is an unwillingness to share it .... "); 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 ("[Property is] the sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual in the universe." (emphasis added)).
16 Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1995).
17 See id.
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are protected under California right of publicity law, 8 were misappropriated when the defendant, without the actors' permission,
placed robots of the "Norm" and "Cliff" characters in its restaurants to help sell food and drinks. 9 The defendant argued that it
had received a license from Paramount Pictures, the producer of
the television series, and that the copyright in the television series
had provided the producer with the exclusive right to use and permit the use of those audiovisual characters. 0 Since copyright is a
federal right, while the right of publicity is a state right, the defendant also argued that the producer's copyright in the television series (and the audiovisual characters) preempted the actors' state
rights of publicity, which interfered with the Federal Copyright
Act.2' Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit declined to address the preemption question,2 that issue is,
nonetheless, important because a preemption of the actors' state
claims would necessarily eliminate the actors' control over the use
of the audiovisual characters? 3
Whether a producer's copyright in human audiovisual
characters preempts the actors' rights of publicity claims is the
focus of this Note.24 Part I outlines the framework of state right
of publicity law and traces the development of case law involving such a right. Because "[a]dvertisers who want to run a particular advertisement nationally must comply with the law of all
18 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). That statute provides, in pertinent part:
"[A]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner,... for purposes of advertising or selling.... without such person's
prior consent.., shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof." Id. For a discussion of the right of publicity, see infra Part I.
19See Wendt I, 1995 WL 115571, at *1. For discussions and analyses of the Wendt decisions, see J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right
of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 142 (1995); Margolis, supra note 7.
20 See Wendt 1,1995 WL 115571, at *3.
21 See id.
22 See id. ("At the outset, we wish to make it clear that this is not a preemption case.").
23 See discussion infra Part II.
24 One might argue that the problem of preemption is more academic than practical,
since the use of characters is thoroughly addressed in licensing agreements and employment contracts in today's entertainment industry. "But the question can arise even if licenses and contracts are thorough." HOWELL, supra note 5, at 179. For example, a standard employment contract that prohibits the employer-producer to appropriate the
employee-actor's name, voice, and likeness does not cover the situation in which the employee's likeness was evoked by the use of the employer's copyrighted work. See, e.g., 1

ALEXANDER LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS:

AGREEMENTS

AND THE LAW 476-80 (1977); 2 id. at 585-86. Furthermore, "[floundational thinking is not

just a luxury of academics. In hard cases, it is also a necessity for judges and lawyers."
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 4 (2d ed. 1995).
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fifty states,"25 this Note focuses on the right of publicity of the
state with the broadest interpretation-the state of California.
This Part shows that, under existing California right of publicity
law, virtually anything evoking one's personal identity, including

copyrighted materials, can infringe upon the individual's right
of publicity.25 Since a display of a copyrighted work might infringe upon an individual's right of publicity, the right of publicity might threaten valuable rights of a copyright holder, which
are granted by the 1976 Copyright Act ("Copyright Act"). 27
Thus, Part II examines whether Congress intended the Copyright Act to preempt the conflicting state right of publicity and,
if so, what is the scope of such preemption.
Part III applies section 301 of the Copyright Act ("the preemption provision") 2 to resolve the conflict between the actor
and the copyright holder over the use of a human audiovisual
character. This Part introduces the dichotomy between human
persona and fictional persona-the two different types of per-

sona that an allegedly infringing work can exploit.29 This Part
then asserts that the Copyright Act only preempts state rights
with respect to fictional persona and that courts should limit the
state right of publicity to reflect such preemption. 0 Since the
type of persona exploited by the contested work determines the
outcome of the preemption question, Part IV proposes a "fictional persona" test to help courts determine whether the allegedly infringing work exploited a fictional persona.3"
I.

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Saddam Hussein wants to keep advertisersfrom using his picture
in unflattering contexts. Clint Eastwood doesn't want tabloids to
write about him. Rudolf Valentino's heirs want to control his
film biography. The Girl Scouts don't want their image soiled by
association with certain activities. George Lucas wants to keep
25 McCarthy, supra note 19, at 132; see also J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of
Publicity Run Riot: The Casefor a FederalStatute, 60 S.CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1184 (1987)
("It could require a plaintiff to bring as many as fifty-one separate lawsuits in a [right of
publicity case] where the advertisement in question was placed in a nationally distributed
magazine.").
26 See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
27 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994).
28 Id. § 301.
29 For a definition of the human persona and fictional persona, see infra text accompanying notes 123-31.
30 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 317-18.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 320-21.
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Strategic Defense Initiative fans from calling it "Star Wars."
Pepsico doesn't want singers to use the word "Pepsi" in their
songs. Guy Lombardo wants an exclusive property right to ads
that show big bands playing on New Year's Eve. Uri Geller
thinks he should be paid for ads showingpsychics bending metal
through telekinesis. Paul Prudhomme, that household name,
thinks the same about ads featuring corpulent bearded chefs.
And scads of copyright holders see purple when their creations
are made fun of.32

"The best known characteristics by which an individual is recognized.., are his name and/or likeness."33 The common law,34
which was later codified under state statutory law,35 recognizes the
importance of these characteristics and accords them protection
32 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter White I1](Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
33 Kathleen B. Dangelo, Note, How Much of You Do You Really Own? A Property
Right in Identity, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499, 510 (1989) (distinguishing among property,
privacy, and publicity rights).
34 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 60-79.
35 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (text of statute cited supra note 18);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1998). The New York right of privacy
statute,'which protects against the unauthorized commercial use of an individual's name,
portrait, picture, or voice, provides, in relevant part:
[A]ny person whose name, portrait, picture, or voice is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained ... may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this
state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, portrait, picture
or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use ....
Id.; see 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.01[A][11
(1998); Larry Moore, Regulating Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy?, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. 1, 31-39 (1995) (providing an appendix listing the sources and status of
rights of privacy and publicity in each state).
Since the scope of the right of publicity is not uniform throughout the nation, several
commentators have called for a federal right of publicity statute. See Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a New FederalStatute, 16 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 183, 201-02 (1998) ("A federal right of public identity statute would benefit the
public, the judiciary, and those who invest time, effort, and money in their personal identities."); Salomon, supra note 25, at 1186 ("The end result of [a preemption analysis] is always that one party's rights will be enforced at the expense of another's. A federal statute
could provide a solution to this all or nothing situation."); Steven C. Beer & Holly Pekowsky, Rights of Publicity After 'Forest Gump,' N.Y. L.J., May 31, 1995, at 1, 1 ("[T]he current law of publicity needs a facelift, preferably in the form of a federal statute."). However, given Congress's persistent inability to enact moral rights legislation, one
commentator argues that "it is unrealistic to assume that Congress will act to bring the
right of publicity into the federal fold any time in the near future." Barbara Singer, The
Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star?, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT.L.J. 1, 47-48
(1991). Thus, she proposes a "uniform state legislation." Id. at 48. Despite all these proposals, the scope of the right of publicity in one state is still very different from that in another state.
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through the right of publicity.36 Such a right protects individuals,
mainly celebrities, 37 against the unauthorized commercial use of
their names,38 likenesses,39 and/or personal identities.40 "The theory of the right [of publicity] is that a celebrity's identity can be
valuable in the promotion of products and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial
exploitation of that identity. ' 41 By enabling celebrities to control
the use of their identities through licenses and legal sanctions, the
right of publicity protects the celebrity's publicity value from devaluation as a result of overexploitation 42 and "ensure[s] that pub36 For comprehensive discussions of the right of publicity, see generally 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 35; Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954); Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); H. Lee Hetherington,
Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1992).
37 Although the right of publicity protects both celebrities and non-celebrities, celebrities are the main reasons why the right of publicity was created. See Haelan Lab., Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (focusing on "prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players)"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 2.2; Arlen W.
Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity "Wheel" Spun Out of Control, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 329,333-34 (1997); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public
Image: PopularCulture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 167 (1993) ("The right
of publicity was created not so much from the right of privacy as from frustration with
it."); see also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (expressing dissatisfaction over failure to extend right to privacy to celebrities).
38 See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994) (nickname and real name);
Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (real name); Gardella v. Log Cabin
Prods. Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937) (stage name); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (stage and real names); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (nickname).
39 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (likeness); Grant v.
Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1981) (same).
40 See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982)
("Marx Brothers" characters); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974) (distinctive racing car); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Laurel" and "Hardy" characters); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977) ("Mr. New Year's Eve").
41 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); see
also McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919 ("At its heart, the value of the right of publicity is associational. People link the person with the items the person endorses and, if that person is famous, that link has value."). For comprehensive overviews of the different theories behind the right of publicity, see generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 2; Mark F. Grady,
A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97 (1994).
42 Professor Grady explained this danger clearly:
The asset to which the right of publicity attaches is obviously not a reputation in
the old-fashioned sense of good or bad. Instead, it is an image that people enjoy
for itself or otherwise find valuable in certifying products. Although repetition
of these images could for a time increase the value of subsequent repetitions, as
when radio listeners learn to enjoy a new song, ultimately there is a point of di-
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licity assets are not wasted by a scramble to use them up as quickly
as possible." 43
Before the right of publicity was expressly recognized as a
cause of action, 44 an individual's identity was protected under the
right to privacy.45 That right was proposed as a "right to be let
minishing marginal returns beyond which subsequent displays and performances
diminish the value of the asset.
Grady, supra note 41, at 103; see also Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.
1962) (holding that plaintiff-entertainer's professional reputation could be injured as a result of the unauthorized use of an anonymous imitation of his unique style of vocal delivery in the defendant's television commercial) ("[W]e can hardly agree with defendant
that... [there would be no] 'loss of opportunity in the entertainment field.' It could well
be found that defendant's conduct saturated plaintiff's audience to the point of curtailing
his market. No performer has an unlimited demand." (emphasis added)); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 256 (1981) ("[T]he... multiple use of the same
photograph to advertise different (especially competing) products could reduce its advertising value to zero."); David E. Shipley, Three Strikes and They're Out at the Old Ball
Game: Preemption of Performers'Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 397 (1988) [hereinafter Shipley, Three Strikes] ("[T]he unauthorized
use of a person's likeness in an advertisement to enhance the sales of a particular product
could harm the individual by making his authorized endorsements less valuable, by diluting the good will associated with his name and likeness, and perhaps even by damaging his
credibility."); Beer & Pekowsky, supra note 35, at 4 ("A celebrity who keeps her public
appearance to a minimum may be able to command a greater price for the few appearances she does make rather than one who is constantly in the public eye and possibly
overexposed.").
43 Grady, supra note 41, at 98. Professor Grady argued that "[tihe legal right of property can be understood as a fishing license designed to avoid races that would use up reputations too quickly." Id. at 103. He further explained:
Imagine that there is a pool containing fish that no one owns. If there were an
owner, that person would have an incentive to fish slowly enough so that the fish
would be preserved. The owner would think: "Every fish that I catch today is a
fish that I cannot catch tomorrow and, indeed, if there is a critically small number of fish, every fish caught today could mean two fish sacrificed tomorrow."
Hence, the pool owner ...has the correct incentives to conserve the resource.
In the contrary example, the pool is not privately owned, but is either not
owned at all or is owned by a sufficiently large group of people that they find it
difficult to implement controls. In this situation, each angler has an incentive to
catch as many fish as possible today and to give no heed to tomorrow.... The
reason is simple. If the angler does not catch the fish today, someone else (not
the angler herself) will probably catch the fish tomorrow. In this situation, on
each and every day, each angler has an incentive to acquire a gill net large
enough to capture all of the fish in the pool.... When anglers race to catch the
fish as quickly as possible,... the fish may be caught too quickly, and the pool
may ultimately be over-fished, even to the point where the fish die out.
Id. at 102-03 (footnote omitted).
44 The right of publicity was first recognized as a separate cause of action in Haelan
Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). See infra text
accompanying notes 60-63.
45 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See generally
William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960), for an excellent discussion of the
right to privacy.
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privacy was soon expanded to encompass a cause of action for the
unauthorized commercial use of an individual's name and likeness.48 In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,4 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right to privacy protected an individual against an insurance company's unauthorized use of his

picture in an advertisement for its insurance policies. 0 Stating that

the use of the plaintiff's identity unreasonably infringed upon his
personal privacy, the court afforded the plaintiff a remedy for his
"wounded feelings.""
Although this "wounded feelings" argument worked well for
people who were not well-known, 2 courts were not persuaded by
such an argument in cases involving celebrities. 3 For instance, in
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied a well-known football player55 relief
from the unauthorized commercial use of his photograph on a
football calendar featuring a beer advertisement. 6 The court observed that, since the plaintiff was constantly seeking publicity

46 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193,193 (1890).
47 Id.
48 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 332 ("This privacy notion soon came to be seen as
broad enough to give rise to a cause of action when one's name and likeness were used for
commercial purposes without his consent."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.").
49 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
50 See id. at 68.
51 Id. at 73.
52 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 333 ("The privacy rationale seemed workable
enough if the plaintiff.., was not well-known."); see, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-51).
53 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d 229
(10th Cir. 1939); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. 1938); see also
Langvardt, supra note 37, at 333 ("Courts began to see the privacy rationale as illfitting... when famous persons sued over unconsented uses of their likenesses in commercial contexts."); Nimmer, supra note 36, at 203-04 ("Well known personalities connected with these industries do not seek the 'solitude and privacy' which Brandeis and
Warren sought to protect." (footnote omitted)); id. at 204-06 (discussing the inadequacy
of the right to privacy).
54 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
5S Plaintiff was a pro-football player with the Philadelphia Eagles. While at Texas
Christian University, he was selected by Grantland Rice for his Collier's All-American
Football Team in 1938. See id. at 168.
56 See id.
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through the university's publicity department,57 he suffered no
"wounded feelings" and, thus, no invasion of privacy. 8
After O'Brien, celebrities became vulnerable to the unauthorized uses of their identities in advertisements or in other
commercial contexts. 9 However, the momentum shifted when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized
a separate cause of action called "the right of publicity" in Haelan
Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.6° In Haelan, the
court held that, "in addition to and independent of [the] right of
privacy... , a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishinghis
picture."'61 In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that "it
is common knowledge that many prominent persons... [,] far
from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements. ' 62 Thus, the court recognized the right of publicity to provide individuals with incentives to
enter the public scene and to undertake socially enriching activities.63
Since Haelan, the right of publicity gradually gained acceptance in jurisdictions around the nation.64 In 1977 the United
States Supreme Court addressed the right of publicity for the first
(and only) time in Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., 65
where the right of publicity of an entertainer was allegedly infringed upon when a television station showed the entire perform-

57 See id. at 170 ("[T]he action fails.., because plaintiff is not [a private] person and
the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving ... ").
58 See id.
59 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 333-34 (tracing the evolution of the right of publicity).
60 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). In Haelan, the defendant produced a baseball card
bearing the photograph of a baseball player who had already granted the plaintiff an exclusive license to use the player's photograph in connection with the sale of the plaintiff's
products. See id. at 867.
61 Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
62 Id.
63 See id.; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 2.2.
64 See Dangelo, supra note 33, at 508-09 ("The right

of publicity gradually gained acceptance after the Haelan Laboratories decision. It is now judicially recognized in a substantial number of jurisdictions .... "). The right of publicity has been recognized as the
law in 25 states. Of these 25 states, 14 have statutory provisions, and the right is recognized in the common law in the other 11. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 6.1[B];
McCarthy, supra note 19, at 132.
65 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

1998]

FICTIONAL PERSONA TEST

ance of his "human cannonball act" on the evening news. 66 Relying on the Lockean principle 67 that an individual should enjoy "the
product of [his] own talents and energy, [and] the end result of
much time, effort and expense, 68 the Court held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the news media when
they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.69
The right of publicity was further expanded in Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,7° where Johnny Carson, the
famous talk show host, sued the defendant for the unauthorized
71
use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" in marketing portable toilets.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected
the contention that a common law right of publicity did not extend
beyond an individual's actual name and likeness.72 Instead, the
court found that Carson's right of publicity was infringed upon
when the familiar introductory phrase merely conjured up images
of the late-night talk show host.73
The Ninth Circuit employed the same rationale in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.74 In White, Vanna White, the
hostess of the Wheel of Fortune game show, sued Samsung Electronics for infringing upon her right of publicity by appropriating
her likeness in an advertisement. 75 That advertisement depicted a
robot standing in front of a set modeled after the Wheel of Fortune
game show. 76 Although finding that the robot did not constitute
the hostess's likeness within the meaning of the California right of

See id. at 563-64, 578.
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 2.1; John Locke, Second Treatiseof Government,
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (3d. ed. 1698) ("Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his Property."); see also 1 Timothy 5:18 ("The laborer is worthy
of his wages." (internal quotations omitted)). But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 102 (1971) ("No one deserves his greater natural capacity ....
");id. at 311-12
("[T]he initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view.").
68 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
69 See id. at 569-79.
70 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983).
71 See id. The plaintiff argued that he was embarrassed by, and considered it odious to
be associated with, the defendant's portable toilet. See id. at 834.
72 See id. at 835 ("If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been
an invasion of his right whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used." (emphasis added)).
73 See id. at 835-37.
74 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter White I].
75 See id. at 1396.
76 See id.
66
67
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publicity statute, 7 the court, applying the Carson rationale, held
that the advertisement infringed upon the hostess's common law
right of publicity when it evoked her identity. 78 The court further
stated that, as long as the celebrity's identity was evoked, it was insignificant whether such identity was evoked by the robot or the
Wheel of Fortune
set, the copyright of which belongs to the game
79
show's owner.

In sum, under existing California right of publicity law, virtually anything evoking one's personal identity, including copyrighted materials,0 can infringe upon the individual's right of pub-

77 See id. at 1397 ("In this case, Samsung and Deutsch used a robot with mechanical
features, and not, for example, a manikin molded to White's precise features.... [W]e
agree ... that the robot at issue here was not White's 'likeness' within the meaning of section 3344.").
78 See id.
79 See id. at 1399. Judge Alarcon disagreed with the majority on this point:
The only characteristic in the commercial advertisement that is not common to
many female performers or celebrities is the imitation of the "Wheel of Fortune" set.... The Wheel of Fortune set, however, is not an attribute of Vanna
White's identity. It is an identifying characteristic of a television game show, a
prop with which Vanna White interacts in her role as the current hostess. To say
that Vanna White may bring an action when another blond female performer or
robot appears on such a set as a hostess will ... be a surprise to the owners of the
show.
Id. at 1405 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski reiterated this point when the Ninth
Circuit denied Samsung Electronics' suggestion for a rehearing en banc in White II:
It's not the robot's wig, clothes or jewelry; there must be ten million blond
women (many of them quasi-famous) who wear dresses and jewelry like White's.
It's that the robot is posed near the "Wheel of Fortune" game board. Remove
the game board from the ad, and no one would think of Vanna White.... But
once you include the game board, anybody standing beside it-a brunette
woman, a man wearing women's clothes, a monkey in a wig and gown-would
evoke White's image, precisely the way the robot did. It's the "Wheel of Fortune" set, not the robot's face or dress or jewelry that evokes White's image.
The panel is giving White an exclusive right not in what she looks like or who
she is, but in what she does for a living.
989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Langvardt, supra note 37, at 419 ("[I]f
the Wheel of Fortune set serves as any sort of identity attribute, the relevant identity is that
of the television program itself. Vanna White... owned neither the Wheel of Fortune
program nor related properties such as the set." (footnote omitted)); John R. Braatz,
Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America: The Ninth Circuit Turns a New Letter in
California Right of Publicity Law, 15 PACE L. REV. 161, 218 (1994) ("The Wheel of Fortune set is the only unique attribute of the advertisement that reminds viewers of White,
and it is not White's intellectual property but the property of the owners of the Wheel of
Fortune copyright.").
80 See, e.g., Wendt I, Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
1995) (the "Norm" and "Cliff" characters); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992) (song); White I, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (the Wheel of Fortune game show set);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (song).
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licity.8 ' However, if the use and display of a copyrighted work can
infringe upon an individual's right of publicity, the right of publicity might threaten valuable rights of a copyright holder, which are
granted by the Federal Copyright Act.82 Because copyright is protected under federal laws whereas the right of publicity is protected under state laws, Parts II and III examine whether the conflict between the two rights can be resolved through federal
preemption under the Copyright Act.
II.

COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."83 Under that Clause, when Congress exercises an enumerated power, federal laws preempt state regulations where the two
sets of legislation conflict.8 4 Congress's power to regulate copyright derives from the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
81 See White II, 989 F.2d at 1515 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Instead of having an exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her.").
82 These rights include the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display the copyrighted works and to prepare derivative works based upon such works. See
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (exclusive rights in copyrighted works). A derivative work is defined as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id. § 101 (definitions). See generally Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative
Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 209 (1983), for an excellent discussion of derivative works. Examples of derivative works include toys, decorations, mugs, key-chains,
posters, and T-shirts. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 13.
83 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1 (5th
ed. 1995); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander

Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[An] exclusive delegation... of State sovereignty.., would only exist.., where it granted an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.").
For an interesting discussion of federal preemption and how the Framers distrusted the
states during the Constitutional Convention, see Marci A. Hamilton, The Paradoxof Calvinist Distrustand Hope at the ConstitutionalConvention, in RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN
LAW AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (Angela Carmella et al. eds., forthcoming 1999).
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Writings and Discoveries."85 Despite this enumerated power, "the
constitutional language neither specifically endorses nor prohibits
state [intellectual property] protection. ' 86 Indeed, the Copyright
Clause was adopted in its final form without any debate." Despite
88
a brief commentary on the Copyright Clause in The Federalist,
"little is known of the purpose of the... Clause beyond what is
contained in its language." 9 Thus, if Congress intended to prevent
any state laws from interfering with the federal copyright scheme,
the conflicting state law, including the right of publicity, would be
preempted.
In section 301 of the Copyright Act,90 Congress explicitly
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86 Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation,and Preemption: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection,1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 509, 517.
87 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.01[A], at 1-4 (1998) ("Although the committee proceedings that considered the copyright clause were conducted in secret, it is known that the final form of the clause was
adopted without debate"); Abrams, supra note 86, at 515-16 ("At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison and Charles Pinckney presented proposals giving Congress copyright and patent powers. The proposals were referred to the Committee of Detail, and on
September 5, 1787 the Clause in its final form was adopted without debate."). According
to Professor Abrams, the "brief" and "ambiguous" passage in The Federalist suggests
"that in the public debate over ratification of the proposed constitution, the issue of copyright was comparatively insignificant." Id. at 516 n.38; see also JAMES MADISON, NOTES
OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 478 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio
Univ. Press 1966) (stating Pinckney's proposal for the Copyright Clause); id. at 580-81 (indicating that the final form of the Copyright Clause was adopted without debate); Marci
A. Hamilton, The Dormant Copyright Clause 14 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause].
88 James Madison offered the following commentary in The Federalist:
The utility of [the copyright] power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of the
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong
to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of
the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 84, at 271-72 (James Madison).
89 Abrams, supra note 86, at 515; see also L.R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 203-12 (1968); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929); Ralph Oman, The Copyright Clause: "A Charterfor a Living People," 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99,103 (1987).
90 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (preemption). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common
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states its intent to preempt state laws when: (1) the contested
subject matter is "fixed in a tangible medium of expression"'" and
comes within the scope of the Copyright Act;92 and (2) the right
protected by the state law is equivalent to any of the exclusive
law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed
in any tangible medium of expression; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 ....
Id.
91 Id. § 301(a). "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration." Id. § 101 (definitions). "A work consisting
of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if
a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission." Id.
92 The scope of the Copyright Act is defined in sections 102 and 103. Section 102 provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Id. § 102 (subject matter of copyright). Section 103 provides:
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.
Id. § 103 (compilations and derivative works).
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rights protected under the Act.93 Despite this "mechanical" twopronged test,94 courts have had trouble construing the preemption

provision.95 Although the subject matter prong does not pose
much difficulty, for the scope of the Copyright Act is defined in
97
sections 102 and 103,1 the equivalent right prong is ambiguous.
Not only was the term "equivalent" undefined, 98 the legislative history is unclear as to what Congress intended in enacting the provision.9 9 Instead, the legislative history reflects only that the ambiguity in the provision was not caused by careless drafting or
judicial obfuscation, 10 but was rather the result of a last-minute
compromise by the legislators,0 1 who supported two divergent fed93 See id. § 301(a) (preemption); see also id. § 106 (exclusive rights in copyrighted
works).
94 Abrams, supra note 86, at 580 ("The test of § 301 is entirely mechanical and ignores
any questions of underlying values, goals, or purposes of the copyright statute or of the
Copyright Clause." (emphasis added)).
95 See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1993); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663 (7th Cir. 1986); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1981); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd,
679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publ'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D.
Ohio 1979).
96 See supra note 92.
97 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 11.6[A], at 358
(2d ed. 1995) ("The major difficulty in construing § 301 has proven to be the [equivalent
right] prong of the preemption test.").
98 See id. ("[T]he Act does not define 'equivalency,' a meaningless term which lends
itself to varied interpretations.").
99 See id. ("[T]he legislative history concerning § 301, rather than clarifying Congressional intent, actually obfuscates the issue of what constitutes a right equivalent.").
100 See Abrams, supra note 86, at 537-50 (describing the legislative events that led to the
final version of the provision); see also LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.6; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[A][2]; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][1][f][i].
101When the Copyright Act was originally drafted, section 301(b)(3) provided a laundry list of claims that are not preempted by the Copyright Act. By 1975, the section, as
drafted and amended, read as follows:
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to-

(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106, including rights against misappropriationnot equivalent to any of such
exclusive rights, breaches of contract, breaches of trust, trespass, conversion,
invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off andfalse representation.
S.22, 94th Cong. § 301 (1975) (as amended in committee) (emphasis added); see also H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 24 (1976). As explained by the House Judiciary Committee, this
laundry list was "intended to illustrate rights and remedies that are different in nature
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from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be protected under
State common law or statute." Id. at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748. According to the Committee,
[t]he evolving common law rights of 'privacy,' 'publicity,' and trade secrets, and
the general law of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected as long as the
cause of action contains elements, such as invasion of personalrights or a breach
of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement.
Id. (emphasis added).
However, when the bill came to the floor of the House, Representative Seiberling
(D-Ohio) moved to strike the laundry list from section 301(b)(3). See 122 CONG. REC.
H32,015 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976) (statement of Rep. Seiberling). Based on the Justice
Department's letter, he argued that the inclusion of misappropriation would render the
preemption provision meaningless:
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is intended to save the "Federal pre-emption" of
State law section which is section 301 of the bill, from being inadvertently nullified because of the inclusion of certain examples in the exemptions from preemption. This amendment would simply strike the examples listed in section
301(b)(3). The amendment is strongly supported by the Justice Department,
which believes that it would be a serious mistake to cite as an exemption from
pre-emption the doctrine of "misappropriation." The doctrine was created by
the Supreme Court in 1922, and it has generally been ignored by the Supreme
Court itself and the lower courts ever since. Inclusion of a reference to the misappropriation doctrine in this bill, however, could easily be construed by the
courts as authorizing the States to pass misappropriation laws. We should not
approve such enabling legislation, because a misappropriation law could be so
broad as to render the pre-emption section meaningless.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Letter from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Attorney General, Legislative Affairs, to Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, Committee on the Judiciary
(July 27, 1996), in 9 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, app. 17, at 17-6 to -7 ("The 'misappropriation theory is vague and uncertain.... This apparently would permit states to
prohibit the reproduction of the literary expression itself under a 'misappropriation' theory.... [It] is almost certain to nullify pre-emption ....
").
After Seiberling's motion, Representative Railsback (R-Ill.), the ranking Republican on the House Subcommittee reporting out the bill, asked Seiberling if he "is attempting to change the existing state of the law" by striking the word misappropriation. Id. In
response, Seiberling misstated his original position. Instead of proposing, as he originally
did, "to save the 'Federal pre-emption' of State law," he concluded that he intended to
"leave the state law alone." Id.; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, §
1.01[B][1][f][i], at 1-29 ("Rep. Seiberling apparently did not understand the full implications of his original statement."). After Seiberling's response, the statute was passed,
leaving the section as it now reads. For full discussions of this dramatic episode in the legislative history, see LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.6[B]; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, §
11.13[A][2]; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][1][f][i]; Abrams, supra note
86, at 541.
Because of this confusing episode just before the statute was passed, courts are uncertain of the congressional "intent" behind the rewording of the statute. Initially, some
courts viewed the laundry list (and the House Reports comments on it) as though it had
been enacted in the statute. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[A][2]. Today, most
courts hold that this list has no substantive impact upon the application of the preemption
provision. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t seems clear that the amendment that caused such deletion
was not intended substantively to alter Section 301(b)(3) as regards [those examples originally included.]"); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
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eral preemption positions.12 While the expansive position 03
treated state laws with great suspicion, as those laws tend to take
materials out of the public domain, 04 the competing position 5
viewed state laws as gap fillers that complemented federal intellectual property laws.' °6 In the end, a compromise was struck, the list
F.2d 663, 677 n.25 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[W]e place little weight on the deletion of the list of
nonequivalent rights."); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1533
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[N]o inference as to Congress's intent may be drawn from the fact that
the illustrative list was dropped from the statute as it finally was enacted.").
102 See sources cited supra note 100.
103 Judge Learned Hand advocated this position. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics Publications, Inc. v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114
F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.
1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.
1929).
104 To understand why legislators held this position, one must realize that future
authors must have access to a well-endowed public domain-the place where fundamental
building materials of a new work, such as ideas, concepts, historical facts, discoveries, and
technological solutions, reside and are freely available-to create new works. See White
II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("All creators draw in part
on the work of those who came before, referring to it, building on it, poking fun at it; we
call this creativity, not piracy."); ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY
248 (1952) ("[Tlhe mind cannot feed upon itself, it can conjure its marvels only out of the
stuff that has been supplied to it from the outside."); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis] ("Creating a new work typically involves borrowing or building on materials from a prior body of works, as well as adding
original expression to it."); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966
(1990) ("[E]very new work is in some sense based on the works that preceded it .... "); id.
at 967 ("[T]he public domain is the law's primary safeguard of the raw material that makes
authorship possible."). Thus, legislators viewed with great suspicion state laws that tend to
protect those works that the federal copyright has reserved for public use. See also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,151 (1989) ("To a limited extent, the
federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all
to use."); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964) ("[W]hen an
article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy
that article. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy.., of allowing free
access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) ("[A] state may
not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article
itself or award damages for such copying.").
105 Chief Justice Burger advocated this position in Goldstein v. California. 412 U.S. 546
(1973).
106 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) ("[S]ince
there is no real possibility that trade secret law will conflict with the federal policy favoring
disclosure of clearly patentable inventions partial pre-emption is inappropriate."); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) ("In regard to this category of 'Writings,' Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no reason exists
why the State should not be free to act."); see also International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241-42 (1918) (introducing the misappropriation doctrine).
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of non-preempted state created claims originally included in the
provision was deleted, 1° and the latter position was codified in section 301.108
To resolve the ambiguity of this provision, commentators
have adopted different interpretations of the statute. Professor
Nimmer proposed the "extra elements" test, °9 which was summarized as follows by the Second Circuit in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises:
When a right defined by state law [within the subject matter of
copyright] may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself,
would infringe one of the exclusive rights, the state law in question must be deemed preempted.... Conversely, when a state
law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements
beyond mere reproduction or the like, the rights involved are
not equivalent and preemption will not occur."'
Although this test has received wide acceptance,"' commentators

107 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the legislative events that led
to the final version of the provision).
108 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[A][2], at 11-66.7 ("The 'subject matter'
door of § 301 ... has been viewed as a codification of the Supreme Court's Goldstein
test .... ); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][2], at 1-45 ("Th[e] statutory
condition to federal pre-emption may be seen as a codification of Goldstein v. California."); Abrams, supra note 86, at 560 ("This language apparently was intended to make
the preemption scheme of § 301 conform to the preemption standards set forth in Goldstein."). Nonetheless, the legislators expressed reservations about the latter position while
the law was under debate. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (indicating that the broad Sears-Compco preemptive principle is still
alive).
109 Nimmer's "extra elements" test was described as follows:
[A] right that is "equivalent to copyright" is one that is infringed by the mere act
of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display. The fact that the state
created right is either broader or narrower than its federal counterpart will not
save it from pre-emption.... [I]f under state law the act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, no matter whether the law includes all such
acts or only some, will in itself infringe the state-created right, then such right is
preempted. But if qualitatively other elements are required, instead of, or in
addition to, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, in
order to constitute a state-created cause of action, then the right does not lie
"within the general scope of copyright," and there is no pre-emption.
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][1], at 1-12 to -13 (footnotes omitted).
110 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
111 Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
112 See, e.g., id.; Wendt I, Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1-2 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1995); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426,
434 (8th Cir. 1993); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805
F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544,
563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523,
1533-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645,651 (Ct. App. 1996).
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have argued that the test "simply states a conclusion.' 1 13
Consider, for example, the display of a human audiovisual
character. When the character was displayed in a movie, one
court, applying the "extra elements" test, held that "[a]ppellants
may choose to call their claims misappropriation of right to publicity, but if all they are seeking is to prevent a party from exhibiting a copyrighted work they are making a claim 'equivalent to an
exclusive right within the general scope of copyright." 11 4 By contrast, when the character was displayed as a robot in a restaurant,
another court, applying the exact same test, held that "claims are
not preempted by the federal copyright statute so long as they
'contain elements, such as the invasion of personal rights.., that
are different in kind from copyright infringement.'""" The inconsistent outcomes of these two cases clearly demonstrate how unsatisfactory the "extra elements" test is.
In view of the ineffectiveness of the "extra elements" test,"'
some commentators" 7 have argued that the better approach is to
113 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.7[B]; see Abrams, supra note 86, at 577 ("The typical
argument... that it entails different elements of proof than copyright does.., is based on
a logical fallacy." (footnote omitted)).
114 Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651 (citation omitted); accord ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
908 F. Supp. 640, 662 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding that copyright preempts state computer
crimes act) ("[Pllaintiff cannot succeed on its underlying copyright claim by dressing it in
other clothing."), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright
Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1997) (analyzing ProCD); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A
Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997) (same).
115 Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Wendt I]
(quoting Wendt I, Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,1995)).
116 See LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.7[B], at 363 ("In all but the simplest cases, the extra elements test cannot be applied with any certainty."); Sophia Davis, State Moral Rights
Law and the Federal Copyright System, 4 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 249 (1985)
("Although the 'extra elements' test is rooted in case law and finds some support in legislative history, to rely exclusively on such a test would ignore fundamental principles that
surround the preemption doctrine."); Marc J. Apfelbaum, Note, Copyright and the Right
of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1580 (1983) ("If merely adding an
extra element would prevent preemption, states could easily subvert federal preemption
by simply appending a superfluous requirement to their right of publicity laws."); cf. Smith
v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Plaintiff cannot merely rephrase
the same claim quoting contract law and thereby obtain relief equivalent to that which he
has failed to obtain under copyright law."), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); LEAFFER,
supra note 97, § 11.7[B], at 361 ("In deciding whether a cause of action is preempted, a
court must look beyond the label to determine whether a right conferred by state law
qualitatively differs from the exclusive rights of § 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act.").
117 See LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.5, at 358 ("As always, the ultimate determination
is whether the state law improperly interferes with the policies of federal copyright law.");
Abrams, supra note 86, at 581 ("[A] reformulation of the standards for copyright preemption.., should be done through an intelligent and rational consideration of which allocation of authority over intellectual property will best serve to 'promote the Progress of Sci-
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interpret the statute in light of the traditional constitutional preemption test enunciated in Hines v. Davidowitz. 8 Under that test,
a federal statute will preempt a state law if the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 119 Thus, the Copyright Act will
preempt the state right of publicity law if the state statute obstructs
the constitutional goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."'2 0 Since this approach is more logically sound' and
interprets the statute within the meaning of the Constitution, this
Note finds the Hines test more preferable. Nonetheless, because
of the wide judicial acceptance of the "extra elements" test, Part
III considers both the "extra elements" test and the Hines test.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE PREEMPTION PROVISION

To satisfy the preemption test, the contested subject matter
must come within the general scope of copyright. 22 Since actors
can assert rights of publicity in both their personae and the personae of the fictional characters, this Note examines state rights with
respect to each persona separately. For purposes of this Note,
human persona refers to the actor's persona, which includes the actor's unique personal attributes, such as name, voice, likeness,
physical mannerisms, and personality traits.12 3 However, this term
does not extend to the actor's general physical characteristics that
are not protected by either the right of privacy or right of publicity,
such as sex, size, and hair color.'24 By contrast, fictional persona'23
ence and useful Arts."').
118 312 U.S. 52 (1941). In Hines, the Court held that the Federal Alien Registration Act
of 1940 preempted Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act of 1939, because of the supremacy of national power in the general field of foreign policy and the sensitivity of the relationship between the regulation of aliens and the conduct of foreign affairs. See id. See
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 84, § 9.1-.2, for an overview of the Hines test.
119Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
120

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.

See supra text accompanying note 113.
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994) (preemption).
123 Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (prohibiting the unauthorized commercial
use of a person's "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness"); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the unauthorized commercial use of a person's "name, portrait, picture, or voice").
124 Cf. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) (refusing to recognize "any property interest in the Artie Shaw 'sound"'); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co.,
201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (App. Div. 1960) (refusing to recognize "any property interests in
the Glenn Miller 'sound"'), modified, 341 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1975); 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 35, § 3.2, at 3-6 ("[I]t should not be an infringement if advertiser merely uses a genre
of character, even though it might remind some viewers of an actor that once played such
a character."); id. § 4.15[D], at 4-106 (arguing that it is not an infringement "if an adver121
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refers to the abstract persona of the fictional character that is "independently created"'126 by writers. 127 This persona includes the
character's general physical appearance, 2 ' personality traits, 129 and
tisement that uses a standard 'genre' of characterization, such as a rough and tough explorer who wears a felt hat and carries a pistol on his hip merely 'reminds' some viewers of
actor Harrison Ford's famous movie portrayals of the character Indiana Jones"); Hetherington, supra note 36, at 44-45 ("[Tjransitory adjuncts of personality ... [such as] hairstyle
[or] wardrobe... standing alone, are of such dubious originality and confounding subtlety
as to be undeserving of independent legal existence."); Langvardt, supra note 37, at 440
("[C]ourts and legislatures should clarify the right of publicity's scope by limiting it to
identity attributes that are personal and unique to the celebrity."); Dangelo, supra note 33,
at 522-24 (discussing limits on the characteristics that constitute personal identity); William M. Heberer III, Comment, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 740 (1994) ("Unlike permanent incidents of identity, such as a celebrity's name, photograph or distinctive voice,
these more abstract characteristics, in and of themselves, are transitory and do not sufficiently distinguish one personality from another to be deserving of independent legal protection under the right of publicity.").
125 The mastery of a fictional persona varies with different acting traditions. For example, Laurence Olivier, a famous British actor, "always built his characters from the outside
in." Louis GIANNETTI, UNDERSTANDING MOVIES 271 (8th ed. 1999 [sic]). As Olivier
explained, "I do not search the character for parts that are already in me ... but go out
and find the personality I feel the author created." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); see also HAYES GORDON, A COMPLEAT COMPENDIUM OF ACTING AND
PERFORMING 111 (1992) (describing the identity technique) ("Identity... requires superimposing a character onto your fellow actor. But this character is totally (or largely)
fictitious."); id. ("Identity concerns an invented [person].... Therefore he is as unlimited
in characteristics as your imagination allows."). By contrast, Constantin Stanislavski, the
cofounder of the Moscow Art Theater, emphasized emotional recall in which actors recalled their own feelings and experiences and substituted them for those of their characters. See id. at 272. To Stanislavski, a characterization is "a true mutation" of the actor's
own personality. CONSTANTIN STANISLAVSKI, BUILDING A CHARACTER 23 (Elizabeth
R. Hapgood trans., 1949); see also id. at 28 ("[A] characterization is the mask which hides
the actor-individual. Protected by it he can lay bare his soul down to the last intimate detail. This is an important attribute or feature of characterization.").
126 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
127 Cf. Margolis, supra note 7, at 645 ("Dialogue written by screenwriters adds additional depth to the character, enabling the audience to learn more about the character's
attitudes and persona.").
128 The general physical appearance of a character does not include the peculiar facial
features of the underlying actor who personified the character. For example, "Norm"'s
general physical appearance includes his overweight body but does not include George
Wendt's facial features. See Behind the Scenes at Cheers, LIFE, May 1993, at 57, 57 ("I'm
like Norm in one respect.... Beer is my life.... Every year I have to gain seventy-five
pounds to play Norm. I put it on before we start the shows and I take it off after we've
finished."); cf. Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1983) (comparing
Ralph Hinkley to Superman) ("[Superman is] a tall, well-built, dark-haired, and strikingly
handsome young man.... Although Hinkley is attractive, his physical appearance is not
imposing: he is of medium height with a slight build and curly, somewhat unkempt, blond
hair.").
129 The personality traits of a character include only those personality traits that are
specifically created by writers and are depicted within the audiovisual work. These traits
do not include those of the underlying actor. For instance, "Norm"'s personality traits in-
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physical mannerisms 3 ° but does not comprise any of the actor's
unique personal attributes, which are not created by writers. 3 '
To illustrate, a robot displaying Vanna White's likeness 3 2 exploited a human persona. Although White played the role of the
hostess of the Wheel of Fortune game show,'33 such a role does not
constitute an abstract persona created by writers. Rather, that role
' her own human perdepicted White's own "natural likeness," 134
sona. By contrast, a robot that displayed "Rocky Balboa" 3'-the
hero of the Rocky movie series-but not Sylvester Stallone's peculiar facial features exploited a fictional persona. Instead of a
five-foot-ten, muscular, English-speaking celebrity-actor, "Rocky"
was specifically created for the first Rocky movie'36 to portray a
simple-minded, thirty-year-old Philadelphia boxer, who tried to
clude his jolly character. See Rebecca Bricker, Take One, PEOPLE, July 9, 1984, at 23, 23
("I always play a jolly fat guy. I wanted to play a scuzzy character for a change."). However, if George Wendt himself were to have a scuzzy personal character, such trait would
not be included in "Norm"'s persona.
130 Itwould be hard to argue whether trivial physical mannerisms, like scratching one's
head, or biting one's nails, belong to the fictional persona or the human persona. However, if certain physical mannerisms are created specifically for the audiovisual work, the
copyright holder has a strong property claim over those created mannerisms.
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. i (1995)
("[Clopyright in a film or videotape of a person's performance does not extend to the personal likeness or other identifying characteristics of the performer ....Thus, the subject
matter of the right of publicity generally lies outside the scope of copyright."); see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) ("[C]opyright
does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those constituent elements that are not original ...[including] works, facts, or materials in the public domain."). But see Margolis, supra note 7, at 657 ("The law grants the copyright owner
the exclusive use of his copyright, which includes the likeness of an actor in character just
as it may include the costumes designed by another studio employee." (footnote omitted)).
132 Vanna White's persona was the subject matter contested in White 1. 971 F.2d 1395
(9th Cir. 1992); see discussion supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
133 See White 11, 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
134 Heberer, supra note 124, at 745 ("Vanna White's natural likeness is indistinguishable from her likeness on Wheel of Fortune because she plays herself on the show.").
135 The copyright of the "Rocky" character was contested in Anderson v. Stallone. No.
87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). In Anderson, the
court held that the Copyright Act preempts both the plaintiff's unjust enrichment and unfair trade practice claims. See id. at *5.
136 Although Sylvester Stallone played "Rocky," he also created "Rocky"'s fictional
persona in his capacity as a writer. See id. at *1 ("Sylvester Stallone wrote each script and
played the role of Rocky Balboa, the dominant character in each of the movies."). Noticing these two different capacities is important, because a person may take up more than
one capacity within a single project, and such capacity (or capacities) may eventually affect
that person's rights in the creative work. For instance, an actor should have the exclusive
right to use the audiovisual characters he played if he is also the copyright holder of the
audiovisual work. However, this exclusive right originates from his capacity as a copyright
holder, rather than his capacity as an actor.
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make "the big time" by fighting against the heavyweight champion.' Indeed, one court has recognized "Rocky" as "one of the
most highly delineated.., characters in modern American cinema. "138
Unfortunately, not all characters can be distinguished that
easily. Standing in between a human persona and a fictional persona is a hybridpersona, which is commonly found in characters in
a television situation comedy. Examples of such persona include
"Norm Peterson" from Cheers139 and "Jerry Seinfeld" from Seinfeld.10 Because this hybrid persona contains both the actor's human persona and the character's fictional persona, 4 ' determining
whether works displaying such persona exploit a human persona
or a fictional persona is very difficult. Thus, Part IV proposes a
"fictional persona" test to help determine
the type of persona the
42
allegedly infringing work exploited.
A. Human Persona
For preemption to occur, both the subject matter and equiva43
lent right prongs of the preemption provision must be satisfied.
If either prong fails, the state created right will not be preempted.
To satisfy the subject matter prong, the contested subject matter
must be both a "work[] of authorship"'144 and "fixed in [a] tangible
medium of expression.' '1 45 A human persona fails both requirements. 146
"[O]ne is not the 'author' of one's face or appearance, no matter how much cosmetic surgery has been performed. Either God,
See ROCKY (United Artists 1976).
Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *7.
139 Cheers (Paramount Pictures 1982-1991); see discussion infra Part IV.
140 Seinfeld (Castle Rock Entertainment 1990-1998).
141 See discussion infra Part IV. Unlike the "Jerry" character, other characters in the
show, such as "Kramer," "George," and "Elaine," present less difficulty when one has to
distinguish between the fictional persona and the human persona. See Jerry Seinfeld: Part
Serious Artist, Part Arrested Adolescent, the Man Behind Mulva Is, at Heart, a Stand-up
Guy, PEOPLE EXTRA (Special Seinfeld Farewell Issue), Spring 1998, at 24, 26 [hereinafter
Part Serious Artist] ("His TV costars were all actors who created characters distinct from
themselves.").
142 See infra text accompanying notes 320-21.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93; see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994) (preemption); LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 11.5; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[A][2].
144 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (subject matter of copyright).
145 Id.
146 See Paul Heald, FederalIntellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 995 (1991) ("Federal protection of personal appearance, style, likeness, and reputation is simply not available under the categories currently listed in sections
102(a) or 103(a) of the Copyright Act.").
137
138
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fate or one's parent's genes 'authored' this work." 147 Even when
one's persona is embodied in a copyrighted work, such as a motion
picture or a television series, "such name and likeness does not become a work of authorship.' 1 48 Indeed, "it is ridiculous to regard
the people49 who might be pictured in a photograph or painting as
authors."'

In addition, a human persona, "var[ying] with time and tribu15 cannot be "fixed" within the meaning of the Copyright
lation,""
Act.' Indeed, any "[a]rgument[] that one's persona may be captured in various tangible media and therefore may be protected by
the Copyright Act reveal[s] a fundamental misconception of the
nature and extent of the Act's protection.' 15 2 Thus, a human persona does not come within the general scope of copyright 5 3 and
fails the subject matter prong of the preemption test.5 4 Accordingly, the Copyright Act does not preempt any state rights with respect to human persona. 5
147 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[C][2], at 11-73; see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (defining "author" as "he to whom anything
owes its origin").
841 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-23 ("Such name and likeness do not become a work of authorship simply because they are embodied in a copyrightable work such as a photograph.").
149 Shipley, Three Strikes, supra note 42, at 387.
150 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 5.5[B][3], at 5-49.
'5' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definitions) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord ... is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration."); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.13[C][2], at
11-73 ("[lIt is difficult to see how a person's face, appearance or persona is a 'fixed'
work."); Heald, supra note 146, at 995 ("[A] person's identity or persona is [not] . .. 'fixed
in any tangible medium of expression."'); Michael J. McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption and First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a
Recognized State Right, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 415, 423 (1984) ("One's [human] persona, in
all its varying aspects, is incapable of reduction to tangible form.").
152 McLane, supra note 151, at 423; see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
448 (Cal. 1979) ("The intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of publicity
simply does not constitute a writing. That interest may be valuable due to the individual's
creative intellectual labors, but the publicity value generated by these labors is not focused
in a 'physical rendering."'); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 1.01[B][1][c], at 1-23
("A persona can hardly be said to constitute a 'writing' of an 'author' within the meaning
of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution." (footnote omitted)).
153 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (subject matter of copyright) (text of statute cited supra note
92).

154 Since the subject matter prong fails, courts do not have to examine the equivalent
right prong.
'55 See Benn v. Playskool, Inc., No. CV91 0121058 S, 1995 WL 155439, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1995) (holding that federal copyright law does not preempt state law
claim for infringement of the right of publicity by unauthorized use of photo in advertising); Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that copyright
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This conclusion is consistent with the holdings in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.'56 and Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.'57
In both cases, an entertainer's human persona was exploited. In
White, because Vanna White's role as the game show hostess did
not constitute a fictional persona, "8 her human persona was
evoked when Samsung Electronics combined together, on a single
advertisement, the actress's "dress, hair color, and pose turning a
'
letter on distinctive and widely recognizable game board."159
White's state right of publicity claim was therefore not preempted. 160 Likewise, in Waits, Tom Waits' "raspy, gravelly singing
voice," which constitutes part of the singer's human persona, was
61
misappropriated by Frito-Lay's radio commercial.
His state right
62
of publicity claim was therefore not preempted.
B. FictionalPersona
Unlike a human persona, a fictional persona satisfies the sublaw does not preempt athletes' claims against the unauthorized use of their photos imprinted on a jersey); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 131,
§ 46 cmt. i ("Claims for infringement of the right of publicity are thus not generally preempted by federal law."). But see Margolis, supra note 7, at 632 ("[T]he studio who hired
the actor should be able to control the use of a character it has developed, including images of the actor in role. The studio's rights should surpass even the actor's right of publicity." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
156 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
157 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
159 McCarthy, supra note 19, at 136. Judge Goodwin explained the court's holding
clearly:
Viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in the present
case say little. Viewed together, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the
ad is meant to depict. The female-shaped robot is wearing a long gown, blond
wig, and large jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at times, but so do
many other women. The robot is in the process of turning a block letter on a
game-board. Vanna White dresses like this while turning letters on a gameboard but perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing women do this as well. The
robot is standing on what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set.
Vanna White dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. She is the only one.
White 1, 971 F.2d at 1399.
160 See id. ("Because White has alleged facts showing that Samsung and [the advertising
agency] had appropriated her identity, the district court erred by rejecting, on summary
judgment, White's common law right of publicity claim.").
161 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 ("Waits' claim ...is for infringement of voice, not for infringement of a copyrightable subject such as sound recording or musical composition.").
162 See id. ("We rejected copyright preemption in Midler because voice is not a subject
matter of copyright: 'A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not "fixed."' ... As a
three-judge panel, we are not at liberty to reconsider this conclusion, and even if we were,
we would decline to disturb it." (quoting Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th
Cir. 1988))).
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ject matter prong of the preemption test. Since a fictional persona
is, by definition, "independently created by,"'63 and "owes its origin, '64 to writers, that persona constitutes a "work[] of authorship' 1 65 and may satisfy the constitutional originality requirement
mandated by Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co. 66 Moreover, because the embodiment of a fictional persona
on film is "sufficiently permanent.., to permit it to be perceived
[or] reproduced [with the aid of a device] for a period of more than
transitory duration,' 1 67 a fictional persona is "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression"' 168 and therefore fits within the scope of the
Copyright Act.
Even though the subject matter prong is satisfied, the equivalent right prong must also be satisfied for preemption to occur. To
determine whether the equivalent right prong is satisfied, courts
have adopted two different approaches. The first approach utilizes
Professor Nimmer's "extra elements" test. 69 Under that test, unless a state law "contain[s] elements... that are different in kind
1 that law will be preempted if it
from copyright infringement,"' 70
can be infringed upon by an act that would infringe upon one of
the exclusive rights protected under the Copyright Act. 7'
The right to prepare derivative works of a fictional persona is
apparently an exclusive right protected under the Copyright Act.
The outcome of the preemption test therefore depends on whether
the state created right contains elements that are different in kind
from those of copyright. Actors, like those in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,"' would argue that the state created right "contain[s]
163 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("To qualify
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author...
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
164 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (defining "author"
as "he to whom anything owes its origin").
165 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (subject matter of copyright).
166 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) ("Originality is a constitutional requirement."). For discussion of Feist, see infra text accompanying notes 333-35.
167 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of fixation); see also id. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection
subsists... in... works... fixed in any tangible medium of expression ....from which
they can be perceived, reproduced.., with the aid of a machine or device.").
168 Id. § 102(a) (subject matter of copyright).
169 See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
170 Wendt II, 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wendt I, Nos. 93-56318, 9356510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,1995)) (emphasis added).
171 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.
1983) (articulating the "extra elements" test), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
172 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
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elements, such as the invasion of personal rights.' 1 73 However, this
argument confuses the litigated subject matter. Human persona is
not at issue, fictional persona is. Since a fictional persona, by definition, does not contain any personal attributes of the actor, the
state created right does not contain any extra elements, such as invasion of privacy, and is accordingly preempted by the Copyright
Act.
The second approach utilizes the Hines test,7 which provides
that a state law will be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." '75 Since the ultimate goal of the copyright scheme is
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, ' 176 the state
created right will be preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of this constitutional goal.
1. Economic Incentives
Although courts generally prefer structural analysis to economic analysis in resolving the preemption question,177 economic
analysis is appropriate in the copyright context, because the balance between federal and state law "is based on specific economic
78
incentives and disincentives.'
a. OriginalWorks
The primary purpose of copyright is "to foster the creation
and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare,' ' 79
173 Id. at 810 (quoting Wendt 1, 1995 WL 115571, at *1) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beer & Pekowsky, supra note 35, at 4 ("[T]he right of publicity is an economic rather than personal right ... .
174 See supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
175 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
177 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,156-57 (1989)
(emphasizing the proper functions of federal courts, rather than the economic efficiency of
federal patent law); see also Heald, supra note 146, at 967-68. Professor Heald suggested
that there are two possible reasons for such disfavor. First, "[dietermining whether a state
statute is efficient will almost always be beyond the expertise of courts." Id. at 968. Second, "[f]ederalism concerns militate withholding the inexact task of determining efficiency
from the courts because the consequence of error is so high-the invalidation of state legislation." Id.
178 Heald, supra note 146, at 967 ("Since that balance is based on specific economic incentives and disincentives, the preemption question quite appropriately lends itself to economic analysis." (emphasis added)); see also Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra
note 104, at 325 ("Intellectual property is a natural field for economic analysis of law, and
copyright is an important form of intellectual property." (footnote omitted)).
179 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 5
(Comm. Print 1961); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
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thus advancing "the Progress of Science and useful Arts."180
Stimulation is provided by giving copyright holders exclusive rights
to control and profit from the use of their intellectual creations."'
These exclusive rights include the rights to reproduce, distribute,
perform, and display the copyrighted works.'
Granting such
rights is necessary to prevent free riding183 and to generate incentives for authors to create and disseminate works of social value. 84
417, 432 (1984) ("'[T]he ultimate aim is ... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good."' (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975))).
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
181 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 ("'The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."' (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156)); see also White 11, 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Private property, including intellectual property,... provides an incentive for investment and innovation."); Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 104, at
970 ("To provide the author with a market in which she can seek compensation for her
creation, we establish property rights in her work and allow her to sell or lease these rights
to others.").
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
183 Free riding occurs when an individual "engages in deceit to avoid paying the price
that he himself regards as an appropriate measure of its value." Earl R. Brubaker, Free
Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J.L. & ECON. 147 (1975). Economically, free
riders act differently from individuals bargaining for private goods:
Acting in self-interest individuals normally seek to pay the lowest amount for
which potential sellers can be induced to give up a good. Bargaining for a private good differs, however, in that the process culminates in a price that is mutually acceptable to both parties. The potential buyer of a private good may fail to
reveal his full evaluation, but he does so with the knowledge that he will eventually 'reveal' an amount that will be acceptable to his trading partner, if, of
course, an exchange is to take place. There seems no way for the individual potential purchaser of a collective good to adopt a similar approach to the bargaining process.
Id. at.153 n.10. For excellent discussions of free riding and public goods, see generally id.;
Grady, supra note 41, at 98-100.
184 See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 216 ("The purpose of copyright is to attract private
investment to the production of original expression."); Landes & Posner, Economic
Analysis, supra note 104, at 335 ("Some copyright protection is necessary to generate the
incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works .... ); Stewart E. Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1996) ("By giving
copyright protection to works of authorship, we increase the cost of copying, raise the return on creative authorship, and, at the margin, encourage more people to create."); see
also

ANTHONY TROLLOPE,

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

90 (Univ. Cal. Press 1947) (1883)

("[T]ake away from English authors their copyrights, and you would very soon take away
from England her authors.").
It should be noted that some authors may find it worthwhile to create their works
even if their works are not accorded copyright protection. See Sterk, supra, at 1213 ("Not
all 'authors' need copyright protection to induce them to create."). For example, "giving
copyright protection to personal snapshots or home videos is unlikely to have any impact
on their volume. People who take snapshots and videos expect no financial return and
would engage in the same behavior without regard to the availability of copyright protec-
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Consider, for instance, the motion picture industry. The production cost in that industry is very high whereas the cost of reproduction is very low.185 Because of this disparity between production and reproduction costs, the problem of free riding is
acute.'86 Copyright protection is therefore needed to assure writers187 a fair return on their investments in creation. 8 8 Providing
writers, and thus producers (through contractual or work-madefor-hire arrangements),'89 with monopolies over their creative
tion." Id. Similarly, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. would most likely still have made his famous "IHave a Dream" speech during the 1963 Civil Rights March in Washington even if
the speech had not been accorded copyright protection. See id. at 1225 ("It seems obvious
that King would have made that speech even if he had been informed explicitly that no
copyright protection was available.").
185 The low cost of reproduction can be demonstrated by the recording of television
programs on videocassettes. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note
104, at 326 ("While the cost of creating a work subject to copyright protection-for example.... [a] movie ...is often high, the cost of reproducing the work, whether by the creator or by those to whom he has made it available, is often low.").
186 Professor Sterk illustrated clearly the adverse impact of free riding on the authors'
incentives to create:
If the author of a creative work cannot prevent copying, any potential copyist
has an incentive to reproduce the creative work so long as the market price for
the work is greater than the marginal cost of reproduction. As a result, the market price for copies of the work would approach the marginal cost of reproduction. If copies were indistinguishable in quality from the original, the market
price for the original, too, would approach the marginal cost of reproduction. At
that price, however, the author would realize no financial return on his investment in creating the work. In this world, only authors unconcerned with financial return would produce creative works.
Sterk, supra note 184, at 1204 (footnotes omitted); see also Landes & Posner, Economic
Analysis, supra note 104, at 326.
187 Throughout this Note, the term writers is used collectively to include all those creative artists that are responsible for creating the fictional persona of the audiovisual character.
188 See LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 1.8, at 16 ("Without a proper return on investment, a
producer, for example, will not invest the millions of dollars it takes to create a movie, if it
can be copied by a free rider who has none of the development costs."); Wendy J. Gordon,
An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1389 (1989) ("Just as a farmer will not voluntarily cultivate land if any other person can come along and harvest the land, an author
without copyright will not have sufficient pecuniary incentive to engage in the productive
act of artistic creation." (quoting S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price
Discrimination,in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT
AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 184 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986))); Sterk, supra note 184, at 1212 ("[C]opyright is most critical when the cost of copying is low relative
to the cost of initial creation.").
189 Under the United States copyright system, the producer is considered the legal
author and the first copyright holder of the audiovisual work unless writers reserve their
copyright rights through contracts. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (works made for hire);
see also discussion infra Part III.B.3. However, this legal presumption of authorship is different in Europe:
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1 but
works not only enables them to recapture their investments, 90
also raises their returns by increasing the reproduction costs
through legal sanctions, thus preventing others from free riding on
the writers' creative efforts. 9 '
If, by asserting their state claims, actors were able to interfere
with the copyright holders' exclusive use of the copyrighted works,
such interference would prevent copyright holders from obtaining
monopoly profits. Incentives generated under the existing copyright scheme would therefore be reduced,"" and the market would
shift rewards 93 for the creation of the fictional persona 194 from
In France, the authors are presumed, in the absence of contrary proof, to be the
author of the script, the author of the adaptation, the author of the dialogue, the
author of the music composed for the work, and the director. Germany does not
define the motion picture authors in its statutory code; however, German jurisprudence looks first to the director, cameraman and cutter as the authors.
Laura A. Pitta, Economic and Moral Rights Under U.S. Copyright Law: Protecting
Authors and Producers in the Motion PictureIndustry, 12 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 6 (1995)
(footnote omitted). Indeed, in 1993 the European Communities adopted a directive specifying that "[t]he principal director of a cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be considered as its author or one of its authors." Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October
1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art.
2(1), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11.
190 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 342 (Comm.

Print 1963) [hereinafter MPAA COMMENTS] (comments received from the Motion Picture Association of America, Mar. 2, 1962) ("When the motion picture is completed, the
producer becomes the owner of a new copyrightable creation, the motion picture, and
seeks to recoup his investment under the protection of his own copyright in that new creation.").
191 See Sterk, supra note 184, at 1207 ("By giving copyright protection to works of
authorship, we increase the cost of copyright, raise the return on creative authorship, and,
at the margin, encourage more people to create.").
192 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 424 ("[T]he interests of the copyright owner stand
at risk of being diminished by the White version of the right of publicity.").
193 Judge Kennedy expressed this point succinctly in his dissent in Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.:
[T]he majority is awarding Johnny Carson a windfall, rather than vindicating his
economic interests, by protecting the phrase "Here's Johnny" which is merely
associated with him.... There is nothing in the record to suggest that "Here's
Johnny" has any nexus to Johnny Carson other than being the introduction to
his personal appearances. The phrase is not part of an identity that he created.... The phrase [did not] ... originate[] with Johnny Carson ....

[It] is not

said by Johnny Carson, but said of him .... [It is said generally] by Ed McMahon in a drawn out and distinctive voice after the theme music to "The Tonight
Show" is played, and immediately prior to Johnny Carson's own entrance....
[I]n awarding publicity rights in a phrase neither created by him nor performed by him, economic reward and protection is divorced from personal incentive to produce on the part of the protected and benefited individual. Johnny
Carson is simply reaping the rewards of the time, effort and work product of oth-
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writers to actors.'95 As a result, some writers "would find it worthwhile to abandon authorship for other pursuits,' 9 6 and our society
would suffer,197 as some writers would not use talents and expertise
in ways corresponding to their abilities. 198

698 F.2d 831, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation
and footnote omitted); see also Heberer, supra note 124, at 750 ("[White] not only protects
Vanna White's ability to be compensated for her own endeavors but also allows her to be
compensated for the endeavors of others; based on the tenuous assertion that the defendants in some way appropriated her 'persona."').
194 Cf. Carson, 698 F.2d at 839 (stating that the phrase "Here's Johnny" was "neither
created by him nor performed by him"); Langvardt, supra note 37, at 419 ("In effect[,]...
the Ninth Circuit ruled that [Vanna] White was entitled to claim, as a protected attribute
of her identity, someone else's property."); David A. Kaplan & Tessa Namuth, I'd Like to
Buy a Dollar, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 54, 54 ("It's really Norm and Cliff-and the
clever folks who created them-who have a beef with the bars." (emphasis added)); Michael C. Lasky & Howard Weingrad, Is PermissionNeeded to Make His Day?; Right of
Publicity Often Implicated by New Systems, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7, 1994, at S-1, S-1 ("[Even
though t]he phrase, 'Go ahead, make my day,' is so indelibly linked with [actor Clint]
Eastwood that its mere use ...unquestionably evokes his image[,] ... it is by no means his
personal property [but] a scripted line from a movie ...[which] belongs to the movie's
producers, not to Mr. Eastwood.").
The actors' minimal involvement in creating the fictional persona weakens tremendously the unjust enrichment theory on which many rights of publicity cases were based.
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) ("'The rationale
for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will."' (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort LawWere Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)));
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Where an actor's screen persona
becomes so associated with him that it becomes inseparable from the actor's own public
image, the actor obtains an interest in the image which gives him standing to prevent mere
interlopersfrom using it without authority." (emphasis added)); Carson, 698 F.2d at 837
("Vindication of the right [of publicity] will.., tend to prevent unjust enrichment by
persons.., who seek commercially to exploit the identity of celebrities without their
consent.").
195 Cf. GIANNETrI, supra note 125, at 362 ("Perhaps more than any of the director's
other collaborators, the screenwriter has been brought forward from time to time as the
main 'author' of a film."); id. at 239 ("No matter what you do in film, it is, after all, bits
and pieces for the director, and that's marvelous for the director but it doesn't allow the
actor to learn to mold a part. In films, it's the director who is the artist." (statement of
Actress Kim Stanley) (internal quotations omitted)).
196 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1207; see also Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 104,
at 970 ("In a world in which such reproduction is not restrained, an author will be unable
to recover the costs of creating a work and will therefore forgo the creative endeavor in
favor of something more remunerative.").
197 See Grady, supra note 41, at 102 ("For singing, [Tom] Waits receives an amount
that.., corresponds to a real social asset. Society would be poorer if Waits left singing
and took up work as an auctioneer.").
198 See id. at 99 ("A price lower than cost is economically inefficient, because it encourages people to use [resources] in ways that have lower values than those of the goods that
might have been produced instead.").
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b. Derivative Works
The Copyright Act also grants copyright holders "the exclusive right.., to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,"'199 which includes not only the rights to make movie-

related merchandise and commercials but also the rights to make
sequels, 200 prequels, 201 and spinoffs. 20 2 This right "enables the copyright owner to exploit markets other than the one in which the
work was first published."203 In today's motion picture industry,
where movie costs may be enormous,2 the right to prepare derivative works is much needed.0 5 Indeed, for some expensive projects,
"the prospect of profits from derivative works is necessary to cre-

19917 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994) (exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
200 A sequel right is a "right to make 'subsequent stories employing the same characters
in different plots or sequences."' 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 10.14[L] (quoting Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)); see
also Kurtz, Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 436 & n.42.
201 A prequel is similar to a sequel except that characters are employed "in a time setting before rather than contemporaneous with or after that of the earlier work." Kurtz,
Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 436 n.42. "The prequel is a particularly useful
device when many of the characters in the earlier work die at the end, making a sequel
difficult." Id. The increasing popularity of prequel in the entertainment industry can be
demonstrated by the upcoming Star Wars prequels.
202 A spinoff is "a new television series based on a character appearing in an existing
series." 1 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 5.05, at 5-25 (2d ed. 1992);

see also Kurtz, Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 436 & n.43; see also Warner
Bros., Inc. v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954) ("[H]istorically and presently detective fiction writers have [carried] and do carry the leading characters with their names and
individualisms from one story into succeeding stories ....The reader's interest thereby
snowballs as new 'capers' of the familiar characters are related in succeeding tales.").
203 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 8.5, at 227; see also Goldstein, supra note 82, at 227 ("Derivative rights affect the level of investment in copyrighted works by enabling the copyright owner to proportion its investment to the level of expected returns from all markets,
not just the market in which the work first appears.").
204 See, e.g., "City of Angels" Out to Show That It's a High-Tech Heaven, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 4 [hereinafter "City of Angels"] (stating that "the production cost of Titanic [is] about $1.2m per minute of running time"); John Lippman, Titanic Expected to
Net $200 Million, with High Estimates Near Twice That, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1998, at B7
(stating that "production costs [of Titanic] alone were more than $200 million").
205 Professor Sterk explained this point succinctly:
One argument for giving authors copyright in derivative works is that the
prospect of profits from derivative works is necessary to create adequate incentives for production of the original. The argument is persuasive only in those
situations when (1) the projected returns from the original work are too small to
justify the costs of production, and (2) the projected returns from the derivative
work are so large relative to the cost of producing the derivative work that the
difference will more than make up the projected deficit on the original work
alone. These conditions may apply when the original work is an extraordinary
high-budget movie with the potentialfor sales of toys, t-shirts, and the like ....
Sterk, supra note 184, at 1215-16 (emphasis added).
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ate adequate incentives for production of the original. "106
If actors could challenge the copyright holders' use of the fictional persona, those highly valuable rights to develop derivative
works 7 would be discounted. 2°8 The fear of right of publicity infringement claims would even "deter prospective licensees from
obtaining licenses altogether," 209 thereby preventing copyright
holders from capitalizing on the popularity of their earlier projects. 210 Thus, when the interests of copyright holders conflict with
those of actors, the state created right would prevent copyright
holders from directing investment in areas where they could
maximize their profits 211 and would greatly reduce the incentives
generated by the copyright scheme.
Utilizing Hegel's philosophy,213 some courts and commenta206 Id. at 1215; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994)
("[T]he licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to the creation of
originals.").
207 See LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 8.5, at 227 ("Today, these derivative markets can often be more valuable than the market of first publication."); Bayard F. Berman & Joel E.
Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audiovisual Works and Characters,52 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 331 (1979) ("Star Wars is the largest grossing movie of all time, and Star Wars toys are
setting records in the toy business."); Goldstein, supra note 82, at 209 ("One current,
popular motion picture, selling about $3,000,000 in tickets a day, will reportedly earn even
more from sales of dolls, sheets, posters, books and a full range of character merchandise."
(referring to E.T. The Extra Terrestrial)).
208 See Braatz, supra note 79, at 199 ("[Ijt would reduce the value of licenses which
copyright owners might grant to others."); Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity
Gone Wrong. A Casefor PrivilegedAppropriationof Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 223, 259-60 (1994) (stating that Midler impairs "[t]he income stream that flows to the
copyright proprietor of the song, as well as the songwriter who licenses cover versions of
the composition"); Jonathan A. Franklin, Book Note, Einstein'sHair, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
623, 627 (1998) ("[The right of publicity] could chill the licensing for commercial nonmedia products in which the character is not easily distinguished from the individual
playing the character because it would require licensing both the character and the individual."); see also White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
("[T]he majority creates a rule that greatly diminishes the rights of copyright holders in
[the Ninth Circuit].").
209 Braatz, supra note 79, at 199 ("[Viague claims of 'appropriation of identity' would
be brought by plaintiffs, and creativity would be curtailed by fear of litigation from such
claims.").
210 Cf. Sterk, supra note 184, at 1227 ("Giving authors an exclusive right over derivative
works ... is entirely consistent with the notion that a work's creator deserves to share in
all benefits generated by the work.").
211 See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 227 ("[B]y securing exclusive rights to all derivative
markets, the statute enables the copyright proprietor to select those toward which it will
direct investment.").
212 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 424 ("[When the] celebrity's negative response prevent[s] the advertiser from proceeding with the plan to use a portion of the television
show[,] ... the copyright owner loses out on a licensing opportunity and the economic
benefits it would have provided.").
213 Under Hegel's philosophy, artists' internal selves are abstract and can therefore only
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tors have argued that the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works is needed to protect the authors' personal identities 214 or
goodwill. 15 However, as evidenced by the very limited moral
rights protection offered by existing copyright law,216 this Hegelian
notion of copyright does not comport well within the current
scheme. 17 In fact, the right to prepare derivative works is not
be defined through tangible objects like the artists' creative works. See GEORG HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
43 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821) ("Attainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are
something internal and not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody
them in something external and alienate them."); see also The Visual Artists Rights
Amendment of 1986: Hearing on S. 2796 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights &
Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 12-13 (1986) ("[A] work of fine art
is a precious expression of the heart and mind of the artist .... ") (statement of Alfred
Crimi, artist and member of the National Society of Mural Painters); Hamilton, Dormant
Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 24 ("The product is an extension and expression of
that person."); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
343 (1988) ("Hegel argues that recognizing an individual's property rights is an act of recognizing the individual as a person."); Sterk, supra note 184, at 1240 ("For Hegel, property
is the means by which personality is objectified. Property forms a medium through which
a person obtains recognition by others." (footnote omitted)); cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (Holmes, J.) ("The copy [from life] is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something
unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting .. "); Helfand, supra note 5, at
627-28 ("Creators and owners often identify so closely with their characters, intermingling
their own personalities with those of their creations, that they become quasi-parents. In
such a role, the creators seek to safeguard their 'children's' wellbeing."). For discussions
and criticisms of the Hegelian justification for copyright, see generally Hamilton, Dormant
Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 23-25; Hughes, supra, at 330-50; Sterk, supra note 184,
at 1239-44.
214 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property,68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 609, 610 (1993); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law
Basisfor the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Linda J.
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1541-42; Neil Netanel,
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and
Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 13-23 (1994).
215 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
copyright infringement in a case where seventeen Disney cartoon characters were depicted graphically in the defendant's adult comic books as "active members of a free
thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting counterculture" Id. at 753); Universal City Studios
v. J.A.R. Sales, No. 82-4892-AAH (Bx), 1982 WL 1279, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1982)
("Unless restrained, defendants' activities will ... adversely affect the business reputation
and goodwill of the plaintiffs .... Merchandising will suffer serious damage to its reputation with potential licensees of other types of merchandise bearing the name and likeness
of 'E.T.'...." (emphasis added)); see also Kevin S. Marks, Comment, An Assessment of
the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 786, 800 (1982) ("Th[e]
appropriation of goodwill notion is evident in the character cases.").
216 See infra text accompanying note 260.
217 See Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 25 ("[It is] incorrect that
United States copyright law is constructed on a Hegelian base."); Sterk, supra note 184, at
1239 ("Intellectual property rights are designed not so much to... allow the author to
maintain a sense of identity.").
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granted to protect the authors' personal identities but rather to
protect the copyright holders' investment by preventing distortion
of their creative works.21 Thus, the state created right would impair the integrity of the current incentive scheme by taking away
the copyright holders' rights "to mold the future of their charac'
ters, and to prevent their abuse or distortion."219
2. Psychological Incentives
The existing copyright scheme rewards laborers according to
the market. 20 While producers, who finance,22 organize,2 2 and
provide inspiration and motivation to their projects,223 are rewarded with copyright in their creative works through the workmade-for-hire arrangement, 224 artists, including actors, are rewarded with salaries, plus whatever rights they reserve to them218 See Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 469
(1994) ("[I]f you have a lot of people creating their own versions of characters, [the personalities of the characters will change]. You end up diminishing the value of the product ....); Kurtz, Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 473 ("[C]opying will not distort an author's work, but a purportedly creative use of the work can.").
219 Kurtz, Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 437; see Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. H-82-2377, 1982 WL 1278, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982) ("[I]n
order to maintain a consistent image and appeal for the 'E.T.' character consonant with
that development in the movie, Steven Spielberg ...has retained and exercises personal
control over the nature and quality of all 'E.T.' items to be marketed."); Helfand, supra
note 5, at 628 ("Owners and creators [of characters] seek greater legal protection in part to
insure that no one harms the character by putting it in unflattering or disharmonious situations.").
220 See Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 34-35 ("United States
copyright law... leavies the authors] at the mercy of the market ....); see also id.at 5
("Capitalism is the economic philosophy that underlies and explains United States copyright law.").
221 Some European systems distinguishing rights in creative works "based upon the nature of the right holder, creator or corporate financier." Pitta, supra note 189, at 3.
222 See BORGE VARMER, STUDY NO.

13:

WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON

COMMISSION, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM.
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY

141 (1958) ("[I]t is with respect to [those works that are created by a numerous team of
employees] that the contribution of the employer in assembling the group, furnishing the
facilities and directing the project is especially significant.").
223 See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW

AND LITERATURE 34 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) ("[If] the essence of
'authorship' lies in original, inspired creative genius[,] ... then it is the 'employer's' contribution as the 'motivating factor' behind that work that matters, rather than the mere
drudgery of the 'employee."' (footnote omitted)); cf. Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (stating that the crucial inquiry in a work-madefor-hire case is to determine whether "the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished").
224 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (works made for hire).
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selves in their employment contracts. 25 Creating the impression 226
that people are rewarded according to what they deserve,22 7 this arrangement provides psychological incentives, 8 inducing people to
work hard. 229 In a market economy, where "the principal importance of high compensation is as a signal designed to affect future
behavior," 23° these psychological incentives should not be overlooked.
3. Transaction Costs
Because an efficient, well-functioned market is essential to the
225 For example, some composers and lyricists retain copyrights in the movie soundtracks they helped produce. See John M. Kernochan, Ownership and Control of Intellectual Property Rights in Motion Pictures and Audiovisual Works: Contractualand Practical
Aspects-Response of the United States to the ALAI Questionnaire,ALAI Congress, Paris,
Sept. 20, 1995, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 379 (1996) (providing a survey of contracts
with respect to the ownership and control of authors' rights or copyright in relation to the
making of theatrical films and other audiovisual works).
26 Cf. Sterk, supra note 184, at 1248 ("[T]he premise that rewards in a market system
mirror intelligence, education, and effort ...increases public acceptance of disparities in
wealth and power.").
227 Several courts and commentators have argued that there is a strong Lockean appeal
in United States copyright law. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) ("Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered."); Hughes, supra note 213, at 296-330 ("Reference to
Locke's Two Treatises of Government is almost obligatory in essays on the constitutional
aspects of property,.... For the Founding Fathers, Locke was a foundation for an elaborate vision opposed to a monarchy that was less absolute, but seemed no less irresponsible." Id. at 296); see also Locke, supra note 67, § 27 ("Whatsoever then he removes out of
the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property."). But see Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) ("Protection for the
fruits of such [labor] ...may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair
competition. But to accord copyright protection on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles .. ");Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 27-28 (rejecting Lockean justification for copyright law); Sterk, supra note 184, at 1234-37 (criticizing the Lockean justification for copyright law).
228 See Sterk, supra note 184, at 1247-49.
229 See id. at 1249 ("Whatever its ultimate truth value, widespread acceptance of the
proposition that market participants deserve their rewards may generate advantages for
society-in particular, it may induce people to work harder. Indeed, copyright protection
in some form may be important as an incentive to creative activity." (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)).
230 Id. at 1248. F.A. Hayek explained this point succinctly:
The remunerations which the market determines are ... not functionally related
with what people have done, but only with what they ought to do. They are incentives which as a rule guide people to success, but will produce a viable order
only because they often disappoint the expectations they have caused when relevant circumstances have unexpectedly changed.

2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 116-17

(1976).
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copyright scheme, 3' transaction costs, which may result in a market failure, 232 "can become an obsession." 23 3 Consider the motion
picture industry for example. Because "there [are] so many creative contributions to the finished product,2 3 4 "the work [may] not
be adequately disseminated if the copyright ownership [is] not
placed with the employer." 23 "[T]hird persons wishing to use the
entire work would find it cumbersome to deal with all of the employee-authors. 23 "[B]usiness decisions related to exploitation of
the film" 237 would also be difficult to make when "every decision
had to be approved by every contributor to the film."238 Thus,
when Congress revised the Copyright Act, the motion picture industry, which both consumes and owns an immense amount of
copyrighted works,239 lobbied heavily for the work-made-for-hire
2 41
provision 240 to reduce transaction costs.
Under this provision, works created by employees, called
works made for hire,242 are treated differently from works created
231 See supra Part III.B.1-.2.

232 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1982)
[hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure] ("A particular type of market barrier is
transaction costs. As long as the cost of reaching and enforcing bargains is lower than anticipated benefits from the bargains, markets will form. If transaction costs exceed anticipated benefits, however, no transactions will occur."); id. at 1629 ("[T]ransaction costs are
likely to prevent at least some value-maximizing transfers from occurring if the copyright
is enforced." (footnote omitted)).
233 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,

COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:

FROM

GUTrENBERG

TO THE

CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 218 (1994).
234 MPAA COMMENTS, supra note 190, at 359. These contributions include, for example, script, scenario, music, decor, and visual and sound effects. See also 5 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 87, § 23.01, at 23-5 ("[T]he production of a motion picture involves
and requires the talents and energies of a great number of creative people ....
").
235 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 597 (1987).
236 VARMER, supra note 222, at 141.
237 Dreyfuss, supra note 235, at 597; see VARMER, supra note 222, at 141 ("Ownership
in the employer seems most appropriate where the work is created by a more or less numerous team of employees, such as in the case of motion pictures .. ");MPAA
COMMENTS, supra note 190, at 358-59.

238 Dreyfuss, supra note 235, at 597.
239 See MPAA COMMENTS, supra note 190, at 341 ("In the course of... production,
our producing companies not only create through their employees copyrightable source
materials.., which go into the films, but spend millions of dollars annually as consuming
or adapting users to acquire such copyrighted or copyrightable source materials from
authors or other owners.").
240 See Dreyfuss, supra note 235, at 597; see also MPAA COMMENTS, supra note 190.
241 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 233, at 218 ("[T]he very decision to extend copyright
into corners where transaction costs appear to be insuperably high may galvanize the market forces needed to reduce transaction costs.").
242 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). A work made for hire is defined as:
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by individual authors out of their own motivation. 243 The employer, instead of the employee-creator, is considered the legal
author of the work,244 and the producer, rather than employee2 4 retains copyright in the movie or television series.2 46 This
artists,
provision not only reduces the heavy transaction costs that would
prevent a creative work from disseminating adequately but uphold
the current incentive scheme, for "an employee working for a salary has adequate incentive to create without giving the employee
copyright protection. ' ' 24 7 Indeed, because of the need to bear the
risks of unsuccessful works,2 " the employers might not have
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.
Id. § 101 (definitions).
243 Section 201(b) provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. § 201(b). For discussions of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, see generally Dreyfuss,
supra note 235; I. Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress
Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 210 (1988); I. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's Work-Made-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 181 (1988); see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989).
244 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (works made for hire). For an excellent collection of essays
on authorship, see generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:
TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 223.
245 "The various creative services rendered in the production of a motion picture...
usually are rendered on a 'work for hire' basis." 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, §
23.01, at 23-5. An independent contractor is defined as "[olne who renders service in the
course of self employment or occupation, and who follows employer's desires only as to
results of work, and not as to means whereby it is to be accomplished." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Copyright Act, copyright in works created by
independent contractors are regarded as commissioned works. In those works, copyright
subsists in the authors, rather than the employers, "unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b); see also
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
246 Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial
Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 93, 116 (1994) [hereinafter
Hamilton, AppropriationArt] ("In Europe, the director holds rights in the motion picture,
even though the work is by necessity the product of a number of creative authors.").
247 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1229; see VARMER, supra note 222, at 139 ("It may... be
argued that the present [work-made-for-hire arrangement] has worked satisfactorily in
practice; that employee-authors are compensated for their work .... ).
248

See RONALD V. BETITIG, COPYRIGHT CULTURE:

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102 (1996) ("1O]f the average 350 or so films released each
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enough incentives to create works in the first place if they could
not retain copyright in those works.
If actors could interfere with the copyright holder's use of fictional persona, such interference would upset the balance between
employer-copyright holders and employee-artists and would decrease the effectiveness of the work-made-for-hire provision in reducing transaction costs. Moreover, since the work-made-for-hire
provision was a compromise made out of a very long process of
"negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties with
economic interests in the property rights the statute defines,"' 49
courts have responsibility to honor this well-debated compromise 2 ° and protect the federally granted rights. 21 If courts abdicated this responsibility, they would encourage state legislatures to
alter the balance struck by Congress by enacting state legislation
that contradicts federal laws.
year in the United States, only ten or so will be major box-office hits.... [L]osses ... on
unsuccessful projects ... are nevertheless a necessary cost of doing business."); Landes &
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 328 ("Uncertainty about demand is a particularly serious problem with respect to artistic works, such as books, plays, movies, and
recordings."); Margolis, supra note 7, at 652 ("When a production company embarks on a
new motion picture, it may be taking a risk by using a certain actor, with hope that if the
film is successful, the studio will be able to reap benefits through derivative works and licensing.").
249 Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 859 (1987) (criticizing courts for ignoring the deals struck between participants
in the drafting process); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Independent Judiciary]("[L]egislation is 'sold' by the legislature and
'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation."); id. at 879 (referring to legislation as a
"'contract' between the enacting legislature and the group that procured the legislation").
250 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 (1984) ("[T]he more detailed the law,
the more evidence of interest-group compromise and therefore the less liberty judges possess."); id. at 17 (arguing that it is appropriate for courts to "treat [a] statute as a contract"
where it has been enacted under influence of competing interest groups); Landes & Posner, Independent Judiciary,supra note 249, at 894 ("In our view the courts do not enforce
the moral law or ideals of neutrality, justice, or fairness; they enforce the 'deals' made by
effective interest groups with earlier legislatures."); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (indicating the Court's reluctance to substitute its policy judgments for those of Congress); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)
(same); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (same); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (same).
251 Judge Kozinski explained this responsibility succinctly in White II:
It's [the courts'] responsibility to keep the right of publicity from taking away
federally granted rights, either from the public at large or from a copyright
owner. We must make sure state law doesn't give the Vanna Whites... of the
world a veto over fair use parodies of the shows in which they appear, or over
copyright holders' exclusive right to license derivative works of those shows.
989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Many commentators have criticized the work-made-for-hire
provision.5 2 They argue that, because of the unfair bargaining position between the employer and the employee, employee-authors
may not be adequately rewarded for their creative efforts under
the Copyright Act.52 3 However, if employee-artists are dissatisfied
52 4
with this provision, they should reserve their rights in contracts
or should take collective action to "strike a new deal" with employer-producers through the' political process. Since the enactment of the first copyright statute in 1790,251Congress has demonstrated that it "can and will act to provide copyright protection for
such rights where it is persuaded that it should do so.' '256 Using
252 See Dreyfuss, supra note 235 (arguing for a re-examination of the existing arrangement); Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 17 (1984) (arguing that the existing arrangement is inconsistent with
traditional practice); Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 37-39 ("With
the commissioned work-made-for-hire provision, Congress has stretched the term 'author'
to the breaking point, making this provision inconsistent with the Copyright Clause's limitation of rights to authors." Id. at 38); see also Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d
497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J., dissenting) ("It would thus be quite doubtful that
Congress could grant employers the exclusive right to the writings of employees regardless
of the circumstances.").
253 See Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 37 ("[The work-madefor-hire provision] transformed a desultory industry practice into a set of required form
contracts that shift the balance of power to the publishers, rather than the author."); Marci
A. Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretationand Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1281, 1308-11 (1987)
(arguing that the unequal bargaining powers between publishers and artists allowed publishers to exploit works at the expense of artists); see also Definition of Work Made for
Hire in the Copyright Act of 1976: Hearingon S. 2044 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 34 (1982) (statement of Ms. Robin Brickman, member of the Graphic Artists'
Guild) ("The great majority of artists are not stars. The fact that James Michener can negotiate any contract that he wants is not only debatable but also irrelevant to the problems
faced by professionals at all levels."); id at 73 (statement of composer Elmer Bernstein on
behalf of the Screen Composers of America) (testifying that, even though he is "considered to be probably one of the top composers in [his] field" and he "command[s] probably
the highest fees that are paid to composers today," if he refused to work unless there were
no work-made-for-hire clause in his contract, he "would have to consider some other field
of work").
254 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994) (stipulating that "parties [can] expressly agree[] otherwise in a written instrument signed by them" despite the work-made-for-hire arrangement).
255 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
256 Abrams, supra note 86, at 579. For example, the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e), repealed by 1976 Copyright Act, 90 Stat.
2541, was passed when "pirates were inflicting substantial losses on the [recording] industry by unauthorized recordings." LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 3.19[C]; see also 17 U.S.C. §§
102(a)(7), 106, 114. The Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat.
1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)), was "directed against the increasing number of record stores renting records, cassettes and compact discs to their customers." LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 8.14[A]. See generally David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment

396

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:355

state created rights to disrupt the federal arrangement, however, is
not the proper way to strike a new bargain.
Apart from the work-made-for-hire provision, the Copyright
Act also includes other mechanisms to help reduce transaction
costs, such as the first sale doctrine, 57 the fair use privilege,258 the
preference of monetary damages over injunctive relief,25 9 and the

of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 12
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31 (1987), for an overview of the Amendment. In response to
the lack of adequate protection for semiconductor chips and electronics industry, Congress
enacted the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 900-914) (providing 10 years of protection for mask works fixed
in semiconductor chip products upon registration or first commercial use, whichever occurs first). In 1990 the Copyright Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 amended section 109(b) of the Copyright Act to prohibit the rental of computer software for direct or
indirect commercial advantage. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)). After the United States joined the Berne Convention, the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 was passed to increase moral rights protection to works of visual art. Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A) (providing rights of attribution
and integrity in works of visual art). See generally Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990: Toward a FederalSystem of Moral Rights Protectionfor Visual Art, 39
CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990) [hereinafter Damich, Visual Artists Rights Act], for an overview of the Visual Artists Rights Act.
257 The first sale doctrine relinquishes the copyright owner's control over a copy of the
product once it is lawfully transferred to a first purchaser. See Independent News Co v.
Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 515-17 (3d Cir. 1961). That doctrine was codified in section 109(a)
of the Copyright Act, which provides: "[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); see also Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136
F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the first sale doctrine applies to the common law
right of publicity).
258 See infra discussion Part III.B.4.a.
259 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (injunctions); id. § 504 (damages and profits); see also Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) ("[Tjhe goals of the copyright law,
'to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,' are not always best served
by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond
the bounds of fair use." (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1990))); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988)
("[A]n injunction could cause public injury by denying the public the opportunity to view
a classic film for years to come."), affid sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990);
LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.8, at 300 ("[W]hen damages alone would be adequate, a preliminary injunction will not be issued."); Leval, supra, at 1130-35.
In Caulfield v. Board of Education, the Second Circuit summarized the test for
granting injunctions:
[To be entitled to an injunction,] there must be a showing of possible irreparable
injury [to the copyright owner] and either (1) probable success on the merits or
(2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
583 F.2d 605, 610 (2d Cir. 1978). For discussions of injunctions, see generally 4 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 87, § 14.06; LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.8.
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general antipathy to moral rights doctrines. 26° These mechanisms,
when combined together, allow copyright interests to be freely alienable and therefore "ensure that... the marketplace will261 be
If
unimpeded when a willing buyer encounters a willing seller.
actors could veto the copyright holder's use of the fictional persona to create derivative works, the copyright interests in fictional
characters would no longer be freely alienable, and the state created right would contradict the existing copyright scheme.
4. Limited Scope of Copyright Protection
Because copyright is granted "at the expense of future
creators and of the public at large, 262 the Copyright Act contains some features limiting the scope of protection, 263 such as
the fair use privilege, 2 the right to parody, 265 the durational
260 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 233, at 165-96; Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991
(1990); Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 40 (acknowledging the
"general antipathy in United States law to moral right"); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?,38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985).
But see Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A; CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1998)
(California Art Preservation Act); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-14.59 (McKinney 1984) (New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act); Damich, Visual Artists Rights Act,
supra note 256 (discussing the Visual Artists Rights Act); but cf. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating in dictum that the edited version of the Monty Python comedy
programs broadcasted by ABC impaired the integrity of the artists' work). For overviews
of moral rights, see generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 7.07 (3d ed. 1994);
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 8D.
261 Carl Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists' "Moral Rights"
and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2303 (1993); see also Hamilton,
Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 32 (expounding on the commodification theory of copyright law) ("The United States copyright system favors commodification and
distribution of the product."); Marci A. Hamilton, Four Questions of Art, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 119, 121 (1994) ("[The United States copyright system] assigns value
(through legal sanctions) to intangible property so that artists may negotiate the value of

their works in the marketplace....

On this account,... [the copyright system] ensure[s]

that artists can sell and profit from their original works of authorship.").
262 White 11, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
263 See Abrams, supra note 86, at 528 ("The various limitations on the scope of copyright protection are reflections of this primacy of the public interest and serve to mitigate
the inherent dangers of the copyright monopoly."); see also id. at 510 ("The interests of
the public are paramount and the rights of the public and the public domain are accorded
primacy over the secondary concerns of the authors."); Marci A. Hamilton & Ted Sabety,
Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent Law, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 239, 262 (1997) ("Copyright policy generally favors extending the copyright
monopoly only to the extent that doing so will spur further original creations. The statute
...explicitly recognizes certain exceptions to the copyright holder's monopoly where exercise of those rights would not induce more authorship in the field.") (footnote omitted).
264 See discussion infra Part III.B.4.a.
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limits of protection, 266 and the idea-expression dichotomy. 67
Without these important features, 268 the state created right
would "impoverish the public domain,' 2 69 thereby undermining
the existing copyright scheme.
a.

FairUse Privilege

Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that "the fair use
of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... , scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright." 27° This fair use privilege
"was traditionally defined as 'a privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent."' 21 Such privilege "perSee discussion infra Part III.B.4.a.
See discussion infra Part III.B.4.b.
267 See discussion infra Part III.B.4.b.
268 Judge Kozinski was concerned about the lack of these copyright features in White II:
No fair use exception; no right to parody; no idea-expression dichotomy. [The
right of publicity] impoverishes the public domain, to the detriment of future
creators and the public at large.... Copyright law specifically gives the world at
large the right to make "fair use" parodies, parodies that don't borrow too much
of the original .... The majority's decision decimates this federal scheme. It's
impossible to parody a movie or a TV show without at the same time "evoking"
the "identities" of the actors.... The public's right to make a fair use parody...
[is] useless if the parodist is held hostage by every actor whose "identity" he
might need to "appropriate."
989 F.2d 1512, 1516-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
265

266

269 Id. at 1516.

270 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying the fair use privilege); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9
F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (articulating for the first time the concepts that
evolved into the fair use doctrine). For comprehensive discussions of fair use, see generally LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10 (discussing fair use); WILLIAM PATRY, THE FAIR.USE
PRIVILEGE INCOPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); Leval, supra note 259; William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 667 (1993).
Though the Copyright Act does not explicitly define fair use, it lists four criteria that
are to be applied to determine whether a particular use is "fair":
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of a copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use).
271 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting
HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)); see

LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.1, at 317 ("The doctrine of fair use is a judicially created defense to a suit for copyright infringement which allows a third party to use a copyrighted
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mits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that
law is designed to foster. ''1 72 Such privilege also "eliminates the
transaction costs that might prevent subsequent authors from
quoting copyrighted work to enrich their own. '273
Included as a fair use is the right to parody, 274 which many
commentators regard as the necessary First Amendment restraint
on copyright law.275 "A parody is an imitation of a serious piece of
work in a reasonable manner without consent of the copyright owner.").
272 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); see
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that the fair use
privilege "guarantee[s] ...breathing space within the confines of copyright"); Patry &
Perlmutter, supra note 270, at 668 ("In brief, fair use is a critical safety valve of copyright.
Flexibility and sensitivity in application are essential to its successful functioning." (footnote omitted)).
273 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1211; see id. at 1211-12; see also American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] particular unauthorized use should
be considered 'more fair' when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use, while
such an unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a ready market or
means to pay for the use."); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody
defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally
cannot be bought."); LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.5, at 320 ("[S]ome copyright owners
are less than eager to see their work ridiculed and will not license their work for this purpose. Consequently, the parodist must rely on the defense of fair use ...where biting
criticism and ridicule may have offended the sensibilities of a copyrighted owner.");
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure,supra note 232, at 1627-32 (arguing that the fair use
privilege is needed as a result of a market failure); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis,
supra note 104, at 357-58 (same); Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat's Latest Bad
Trick: The Ninth Circuit's Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (1998) (discussing market failure in satires).
274 "[P]arody is not specifically mentioned in the preamble as a sanctioned fair use, but
the categories of criticism and comment are broad enough to include parody." LEAFFER,
supra note 97, § 10.5, at 320; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 pmbl. (mentioning "criticism" and
"comment" as sanctioned fair uses).
275 See Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 4
(1987) ("[T]he question is not whether these copyright doctrines are available to accommodate First Amendment values; it is whether they are, in fact, interpreted in a manner
consistent with those values."); Michael A. Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective
Scope of the FairUse Defense to Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12
COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 229, 230-31 (1988); Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark,and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.
L. REV. 923, 924-25 (1985); Charles C. Goetsch, Parodyas Free Speech-The Replacement
of the Fair Use Doctrine by FirstAmendment Protection,3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39,40-42
(1980); Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 270, at 709 ("Commentators too have noted that
parody furthers First Amendment values as well as copyright values."); David F. Shipley,
Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v.
Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. REV. 983 (arguing that copyright law has an inherent
capacity to accommodate free speech interests); Julie Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright
Protection: Turning the Balancing Act into a Juggling Act, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 1, 4-6, 33-36 (1987); cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
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literature, music, or composition for humorous or satirical effect. ' 276 The right to parody allows the parodist to "expose[] the
mediocre. and pretentious in art and society."277 By "forcing [the
public] to examine a serious text from a comic standpoint," 278 the
right to parody is a productive use279 that "fosters the creativity
protected by the copyright law." 280
Although "celebrity images are among the basic semiotic and
symbolic raw materials out of which individuals and groups 'establish their presence, identity and meaning, ' ' 281 most celebrities
U.S. 539, 558-60 (1985) ("[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression.... Courts and commentators have recognized
that copyright, and the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing First
Amendment value." (emphasis added)); Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra
note 87, at 42 ("[Tihe Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are built on shared
premises.").
276 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.14, at 338 (footnote omitted); see Goetsch, supra note
275, at 39 ("Parody is a distinct literary form that achieves its ends by imitating the expression and ideas of serious works in a satiric manner.").
277 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.14, at 338.
278 Id.; Dorsen, supra note 275, at 924 ("[S]atire is a potent form of social commentary
which attempts to expose the foibles and follies of society in direct, biting, critical, and often harsh language-tempered by humor.").
279 "Productive uses are those that build on the works of others, by adding their own
socially valuable creative element." LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.5, at 320; see also id.
("[A) productive use should be impeded only when it is so excessive as to undermine unduly the incentive to produce copyrighted works."); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis,
supra note 104, at 360 ("A productive use is one that lowers the cost of expression and
tends to increase the number of works, while a reproductive one simply increases the
number of 'copies' of a given work, reduces the gross profits of the author, and reduces the
incentives to create works."). See generally LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.5, for a discussion of fair use as a productive use. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) ("[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair
use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright .... ." (citation and footnote omitted)).
280 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[P]arody and satire are valued
forms of criticism, encouraged because this sort of criticism itself fosters the creativity protected by the copyright law."); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d
Cir. 1983) ("It is decidedly in the interests of creativity, not piracy, to permit authors to
take well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted works and add their own contributions of commentary or humor."); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) ("[I]n today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law
should be hospitable to the humor of parody .... ); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) ("[A]s a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire
are deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social and
literary criticism."); Hamilton & Sabety, supra note 263, at 263 ("[Fair use] spurs even further creative development by fostering a competitive environment.").
. 281 Madow, supra note 37, at 143; see also Dorsen, supra note 275, at 925 ("[S]atirists
criticize our society by directing their sharp barbs at well-known people, well-known
commercial enterprises or trademarks, and popular literary figures or works."); Gretchen
A. Pemberton, The Parodist'sClaim to Fame: A Parody Exception to the Right of Public-
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would hardly "welcome or even willingly tolerate mockery." M
Since "[e]ffective parody... often requires quotation from the
original,"28 3 "allowing [actors] to retain a veto over such uses raises
a real threat of censorship. '284 Unless the state created right conity, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97, 122 (1993) ("A parody of a celebrity usually exposes the
weakness or falseness of a particular idea or value that the celebrity symbolizes.").
282 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 270, at 688; see Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("[P]arodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied.
Self-esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a reasonable fee."); LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 10.14, at 339 ("[Slome copyright
owners are less than eager to see their work ridiculed and will not license their work for
this purpose."); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure,supra note 232, at 1632 ("Section 107
places first among the purposes for which fair use is appropriate 'criticism' and 'comment,'
uses that a copyright owner might be reluctant to license.").
283 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1212; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 580-81 (1994) ("Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point ....
");
id. at 588
("When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable."); White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("It's impossible to parody a movie or a TV show without at the same time 'evoking' the 'identities' of
the actors. You can't have a mock Star Wars without a mock Luke Skywalker, Han Solo
and Princess Leia, which in turn means a mock Mark Hamill, Harrison Ford and Carrie
Fisher." (citation omitted)); Goetsch, supra note 275, at 40 ("A parodist must copy and
appropriate material from the serious work in order to establish the identity of the other
work, to recall its characteristics, and to produce satiric effects which are often created by
the ludicrous juxtaposition of serious and comic material."); Fisher, 794 F.2d at 435 n.2
("To 'conjure up' the original work in the audience's mind, the parodist must appropriate
a substantial enough portion of it to evoke recognition."); Pemberton, supra note 281, at
122 ("Parodists need access to images that mean something to our society in order to criticize or expose the truth about our society.").
284 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 270, at 688. Professor Madow put this point forcefully:
[Tihe power to license is the power to suppress. When the law gives a celebrity a
right of publicity ....it gives her (or her assignee) a substantial measure of
power over the production and circulation of meaning and identity in our society: power, if she so chooses, to suppress readings or appropriations of her persona that depart from, challenge, or subvert the meaning she prefers; power to
deny to others the use of her persona in the construction and communication of
alternative or oppositional identities and social relations; power, ultimately, to
limit the expressive and communicative opportunities of the rest of us. The result is a potentially significant narrowing of the space available for alternative
cultural and dialogic practice.
Madow, supra note 37, at 145-46; see also White II, 989 F.2d at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Parody, humor, irreverence are all vital components of the marketplace of ideas.
The last thing we need, the last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is a law that lets
public figures keep people from mocking them, or from 'evok[ing]' their images in the
mind of the public." (quoting White I, 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992))); L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of
our daily life, would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression.");
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 232, at 1632-35 (using market failure to
explain the importance of fair use to promote the flow of information); Sterk, supra note
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tains a right to parody or a fair use privilege," such a right would
devoid the public of the "informative criticism and humorous
comment '28 and would stifle the creativity that copyright law is
designed to foster.8
b. DurationalLimits and the Idea-ExpressionDichotomy
Although incentives are necessary to induce creativity, "any
copyright protection beyond that necessary to compensate the
author for lost opportunities would generate no additional incentive to create. '288 Indeed, "an incentive for one author provides a
'
barrier to others."289
Overprotecting authors would not only "discourage production of additional copies even when the cost of
producing those copies was less than the price consumers would be
willing to pay 2 0 but would also impoverish the public domain2 91 to
184, at 1212 ("[W]ithout the [fair use] doctrine, authors would be able to suppress unwanted parody or criticism of their own work.").
8 In fact, some courts and commentators suggest that the right of publicity inherently
contains a fair use privilege or the right to parody. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day
& Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[P]arody, burlesque, satire and critical review might be immune from the right of publicity because of their contribution as
entertainment and as form of literary criticism."), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1982); Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) ("The right
of publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment."); 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 35, § 8.16[B][5], at 8-108 ("Entertainment parodies and imitations such as those
presented on stage should not be barred by use of the Right of Publicity."); Randall T.E.
Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 781 (1988) (calling for a fair use defense in the right of publicity); Pemberton, supra note 281; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)
("[T]he State's interest [in permitting a right of publicity] is analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law .... ").
286 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 270, at 689; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("[Parody] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on
an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one."); White 11, 989 F.2d at 1518 (9th
Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("The public's right to make a fair use parody and the
copyright owner's right to license a derivative work are useless if the parodist is held hostage by every actor whose 'identity' he might need to 'appropriate."').
287 See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980);
see also White 11, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("By refusing to recognize a
parody exception to the right of publicity, the panel directly contradicts the federal Copyright Act."); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 232, at 1632 ("[The fair use
doctrine] is particularly important in a field where advancement of knowledge is the ultimate goal.").
288 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1205.
289 Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor,supra note 15, at 439.
290 Sterk, supra note 184, at 1205.
291 The public domain is a term of art used in intellectual property law to denote the
"true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are ineligible for private
ownership." Litman, The PublicDomain, supra note 104, at 975 (footnote omitted). See
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the detriment of future authors292 by making creation of new,
original works very expensive. 293 Because "society can benefit
from creative endeavor only to the extent the creations are made
publicly available ,' 294 it is important to "strike[] a balance between
providing incentives to create and protecting the public domain
from being stripped of the raw materials needed for new crea2 95

tions."

The durational limits of copyright protection reflect such
balance. 296 The Constitution mandates that copyright protection
generally id. for an excellent discussion of the public domain. See supra note 104 for the
importance of the public domain to future creators.
292 Judge Kozinski explained this point succinctly:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotectionstifles the very creativeforces it's supposed to nurture.
White 11, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Kurtz, Independent Legal Lives, supra note 5, at 472 ("Forbidding the[] use [of characters] will diminish the pool from which all artists must draw. There have been hundreds of Romeos
and Juliets, and Shakespeare's were not the first." (footnote omitted)); Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 104 (challenging the assumption that more protection necessarily
makes for a more desirable intellectual property regime).
293 See Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 335 ("[Tloo much protection can raise the costs of creation for subsequent authors to the point where those
authors cannot cover them even though they have complete copyright protection for their
own originality."); Sterk, supra note 184, at 1207 ("[E]xpanded copyright protection increases the cost to authors by requiring them to obtain permission when they seek to build
upon existing work.").
294 Coyne, supra note 285, at 814.
295 Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor, supra note 15, at 439-40 (footnote omitted);
LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 2.12, at 58 ("[Tlhe court must strike a balance between two
conflicting interests. If the idea is defined too broadly, it will create a bottleneck impeding
production of future works.... [11f the idea is defined too narrowly, future authors will
not have sufficient economic incentive to create new works."); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 326 ("Striking the correct balance between access and
incentives is the central problem in copyright law."); Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse
Emeritus: CharacterProtection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L.
REV. 429, 435 (1994) ("[I]t is... important to make sure that our copyright law does not
provide protection so strong that it enables the [copyright holder] ...to block--or even
delay-the creation of new works and the exploitation of new media by tying up the raw
material everyone needs to use."); see also White H,989 F.2d 1512 at 1516 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]ntellectual property law is full of careful balances between what's set aside
for the owner and what's left in the public domain for the rest of us."); Litman, The Public
Domain, supra note 104, at 969 ("Nurturing authorship is not necessarily the same thing as
nurturing authors. When individual authors claim that they are entitled to incentives that
would impoverish the milieu in which other authors must also work, we must guard
against protecting authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.").
296 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (granting authors the exclusive right to their writings
"for limited Times" (emphasis added)); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (1994) (specifying copyright
duration in various situations). For discussions of durational limits of copyright, see gen-
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exist only "for limited Times. ''297 Following this mandate, the
Copyright Act limits copyright protection to the life of the
author plus seventy years.2 9 Once the copyright term expires,
the creative works fall into the public domain, 299 and the public
is free to use the original work to help create future works.
Unlike the Copyright Act, the state created right "offers no
protections against the monopoly existing for an indefinite time or
even in perpetuity.' ' 00 Thus, actors, when teamed up with copyright holders, could retain monopoly over fictional characters even
if the copyright in the audiovisual characters expires. 301 This extended (or even perpetual) monopoly would defeat the original

erally LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 6.1-.4; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, §
1.05[A][1]; Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of
Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996) [hereinafter Hamilton, Copyright
DurationExtension]; Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 361-63 (discussing the economic rationale for durational limits of copyright protection); William F.
Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal
the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 661 (1996).
297 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 87, § 1.05[A][1], at 1-66.13 ("A federal copyright statute that purported to grant
copyright protection in perpetuity would clearly be unconstitutional." (footnote omitted)).
298 Recently, Congress has extended copyright protection for an additional 20 years.
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994) (duration of copyright), as amended by Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, S. 505, 105th Cong. (1997). Several commentators have criticized this
duration extension. See Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension, supra note 296; Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 44; Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A
Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-GroundedDiscourse of
Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996); Patry, supra
note 296.
299 See Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor,supra note 15, at 440 ("The copyright owner receives exclusive rights for a period of time in return for creating the work in the first place
and enriching the public domain once the copyright term expires."); Hamilton, Dormant
Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 36 ("[Once copyright expires], the product is utterly
divorced from the producer. It moves to a new home in the public domain, where it can
be fodder for anyone and any project, regardless of the first or the second author's attitudes, beliefs, or inclinations.").
300 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Apfelbaum, supra note 116, at 1573 ("There is ... no
uniformity among the states in terms of durational limits accorded the right of publicity.").
301 Because the copyright in a fictional character generally lasts longer than the life of
an actor, such situation would not happen unless the right of publicity was inheritable, or
unless the actor played the character shortly before the copyright term expires. For the
state of post mortem rights under the right of publicity, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, §
9.5[A]. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(h) (West Supp. 1998) (providing post mortem
rights for 50 years after the death of the person identified); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4)
(West 1997) (providing post mortem rights for forty years after the death of the person
identified); IND. STAT. ANN. § 32-13-1-8 (Burns 1995) (providing post mortem rights for
100 years after the death of the person identified).
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purpose of the Copyright Clause,3 2 which was to reduce the monopoly power of the publishing industry.3 3

Even worse, because the state created right contains no
idea-expression dichotomy304 limiting the scope of its protection,30 actors may even take works out of the public domain by
For an excellent historical overview of the Copyright Clause, see MARK ROSE,
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993). See also Hamilton,
Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 9-18 (tracing the historical roots of the
Copyright Clause).
303 See Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 14 ("Despite the lack of
evidence at the Convention regarding the Framers' intent, statements by George Washington.., and by others regarding the state copyright laws that predated the Convention indicate that the Clause was intended to be an integral aspect of the mission to effect liberty."); id. at 16 ("The Framers' choice of language in the Copyright Clause echoes a
theme that resonates throughout the Constitution: all concentrated forms of power are
antithetical liberty. Whether it be the government, a church, or an industry, the American
constitutional scheme is predicated on the division and decentralization of power."); see
also Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension, supra note 296, at 659 ("The British Statute
of Anne, the precursor to the American Copyright Clause, was adopted for the purpose of
reducing the monopoly power of the publishing industry and decentralizing that power by
placing it in the hands of individual authors.").
304 The idea-expression dichotomy "is the term of art used in copyright law to indicate
the elements in a copyrighted work which the grant of the copyright monopoly does not
take from the public." Abrams, supra note 86, at 563. That dichotomy "'strike[s] a definitional balance ... by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression."' Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For excellent discussions of the idea-expression dichotomy, see generally Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The
Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J.
175 (1990); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560 (1982); Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221 (1992); Edward Samuels, The IdeaExpression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989). See also Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[I]t is convenient to define such a use by saying that others may 'copy' the 'theme,' or 'ideas,' or the like, of a
work, though not its 'expression."'); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930) ("[T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended."); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 347-49 (discussing the economic rationale for the ideaexpression dichotomy).
305 See White H, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[N]o
idea-expression dichotomy. [The right of publicity] impoverishes the public domain, to
the detriment of future creators and the public at large."); see also Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (refusing to extend copyright to listings in
white pages in a telephone directory); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (upholding
copyright in statuettes used in the form of lamp bases only to the extent that artistic expression was discernible); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (introducing the ideaexpression dichotomy); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(holding that copyright protects only fictional characters that are sufficiently delineated);
LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 2.12, at 57 ("Once an abstract idea is disclosed to the public, it
becomes a part of our common reservoir of knowledge, and it will not matter whether the
302
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establishing associative links with those works through performance. 06 Thus, the state created right upsets the balance between providing incentives and protecting the public domain. 37
By tying up the raw materials needed for the creation of new,
original works, 38 that right "clog[s] the channels of creativity
and commerce and curtail[s] the ability of new authors to pursue their own works. ''309 The state created right therefore directly conflicts with the constitutional310 goal of "promot[ing] the
progress of Science and useful Arts.
5. Summary
By controlling the copyright holders' rights to exploit their
creative works in creating new derivative works, the state created
312
right reduces both the economic 31' and psychological incentives
generated under the existing copyright scheme. The state created
right also renders the Copyright Act inefficient to reduce transac-

tion costs and therefore reduces the alienability of copyright interests. 313 In addition, the right disregards several important features
originator has spent vast sums of money developing it, advertising it, or making it popular.").
306 For instance, Hamlet is a fictional character that resides in the public domain and is
freely available for the public to use to create new, original works. However, if an actor
could assert right of publicity in that character after a distinguished performance, that
character would no longer remain in the public domain and would therefore be unavailable to the general public. Cf. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("(Ilf the court were to protect performances from imitation, '[i]t
would
have to hold that.., for instance ...Sir Laurence Olivier could prohibit anyone else from
adopting some innovations which he brought to the performance of Hamlet."' (quoting
Supreme Records v. Decca Records, 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D. Cal 1950))); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 432 (Cal. 1979) ("Merely playing a role under the foregoing
circumstances creates no inheritable property right in an actor, absent a contract so providing.").
307 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court made clear
that federal law preempts state laws protecting materials that Congress intended to put in
the public domain:
Where the public has paid the congressionally mandated price for disclosure, the
States may not render the exchange fruitless by offering patent-like protection to
the subject matter of the expired patent. 'It is self-evident that on the expiration
of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.'
489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185
(1896)) (emphasis added).
308 See supra note 104.
309 Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor,supra note 15, at 440.
310 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
311 See discussion supraPart III.B.1.
312 See discussion supra Part III B.2.
313 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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of the Copyright Act, such as the fair use privilege, the right to
parody, durational limits of protection, and the idea-expression dichotomy, and therefore impoverishes the public domain to the
detriment of future creators. 14 Thus, any state rights with respect
to fictional persona "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment
' the Copyand execution of the full purposes and objectives of"315
right Act and are accordingly preempted.
In sum, under both Nimmer's "extra elements" test and the
Hines test, the Copyright Act preempts state rights with respect to
fictional persona.3 16 Since "[p]reemption cases are really instances
of statutory interpretation, 317 courts should limit the right of publicity to reflect such preemption.3 '
See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
316 Even though copyright holders have exclusive rights in the fictional persona, the
Copyright Act extends protection "only to the material contributed by the author of such
work... and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. §
103(b) (1994) (derivative works). Thus, the copyright in a fictional persona grants only the
exclusive right in the portion of the character that is independently created. See Hamilton,
AppropriationArt, supra note 246, at 104 ("The derivative work right makes it necessary
to dissect every text into its constituent parts: ideas, facts, unoriginal expression, public
domain material, pre-existing copyrighted material, and finally original expression.");
Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 104, at 975 ("Where a work of authorship is based
on preexisting sources, copyright will protect only the portions of it that are original."); see
also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) ("The mere
fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be protected."); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 3.06.
317 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 84, § 9.1, at 319.
318 Despite this limitation, actors can adequately protect their human personae through
state rights of publicity. In addition, actors can protect their interests by reserving their
rights in contracts. See Dreyfuss, supra note 235, at 627 (arguing that academics could protect their interests by buying back from universities the right to control the copyrights to
their work, or by refusing to assign the copyrights to the universities in the first place). In
the Copyright Act, Congress made it clear that, even under the work-made-for-hire arrangement, "parties [can] expressly agree[] otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (works made for hire). Contracts that reserve rights to the actors would, therefore, not pose any preemption problems. Moreover, "authors sell or assign that right to publishers by means of contractual agreements all the time." I. Trotter
Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a DigitalWorld, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 1
25 (Apr. 17, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/-jolt/vlil/hardy.html>. These agreements have,
indeed, become "the revenue-generating means of [the] authors' creative efforts." Id. 1
26.
Apart from contracts, actors can also protect their interests by seeking trademark
protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the or314
315
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IV. "FICTIONAL PERSONA" TEST
Since the Copyright Act only preempts state rights with respect to fictional persona, the actor's state right of publicity claim
is not preempted if the allegedly infringing work displays the actor's unique personal attributes, such as name, voice, and likeness. 319 However, if the contested work merely evokes the actor's
human persona, courts have to determine whether the state claim
involves a fictional persona and, thus, whether writers have established a fictional persona in the audiovisual character. To help
make such determination, this Part proposes a "fictional persona"
test: A fictional persona is established if an average lay observer2
gin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). See generally Lisa Von Eschen, Trademark Protection and
Free Expression: The Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
531, for a discussion of the statute. Indeed, that cause of action is not new to practitioners,
for it has been invoked in many right of publicity cases "as an additional provision on
which to base recovery." Salomon, supra note 25, at 1196; see, e.g., Wendt I, Nos. 9356318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1995); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); White 1, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). Given the courts'
"ever willing[ness] to entertain unconventional notions concerning the likelihood of confusion while also relaxing secondary meaning requirements," Leaffer, supra note 12, at
453, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides more than adequate protection for the actor's personal interests that are not protected by state rights of publicity as a result of
copyright preemption. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
839 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The existence of a cause of action under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act... does much to undercut the need for policing against
unfair competition through an additional legal remedy such as the right of publicity.").
319 See discussion supra Part III.
320 It should be noted that an average lay observer, rather than an intended audience, is
used in this test. Cf. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The question... is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audiencefor whom such popularmusic is composed,
that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." (emphasis added)). The Arnstein court stated that the audience test was appropriate for determining substantial similarity because what is at stake is not so much the musician's
"reputation but his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which
derive from the lay public's approbation of his efforts." Id. The reasons are twofold.
First, "[t]he Copyright Act is intended to protect writers from the theft of the fruits of
their labor, not to protect against the general public's 'spontaneous and immediate' impression that the fruits have been stolen." 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, §
13.03[E][2], at 13-94 (footnote omitted). Second, "[t]he ordinary observer inquiry was designed to determine general aesthetic similarities between the copyrighted work and the
alleged copy." Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285 (1984); see
also William E. Hilton, Quantifying Originality: A Logical Analysis for Determining Sub-
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can recognize from the audiovisual character a personality that is
321 Since the
substantially different from the actor's human persona.
test "is based on the subjective reactions of lay observers "312 and
the distinction between a human persona and a fictional persona is
fact-based,323 the inquiry is to be made without any expert testimony, detailed analysis, or dissection.324 Instead, "the trier of fact
is to fall back on an immediate, visceral reaction to the two [personae] and should consider their total concept and feel." 312
The outcome of this "fictional persona" test is consistent with
the preemption analysis in Part III. The fact that an average lay
observer can recognize from the audiovisual character a personality that is substantially different from the actor's human persona
not only suggests that the character contains an "independently
created" m persona that constitutes a "work[] of authorship" 2 7 but
stantial Similarity in Computer Software Copyright Infringement Actions, 31 IDEA 269, 295
(1991) (stating that "functional aspects of a copyrighted work should [not] be thrown into
the vague determination of substantial similarity without any effort to identify and remove
protection of functional aspects from the copyrighted work"). For discussions of the ordinary observer test, see generally 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 87, § 13.03[E];
LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.6[B].
321 This test was derived from the substantial similarity test used in most copyright infringement cases. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,701-12
(2d Cir. 1992); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162-69 (9th Cir. 1977); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (2d
Cir. 1966); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-72 (2d Cir. 1946); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 54-70 (D. Mass. 1990); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner
Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291, 301-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But
see Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity,20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 732 (1987) [hereinafter Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking] (criticizing the substantial similarity test and proposing fair use considerations as an alternative to the test) ("Instead of using some objective standards or
criteria based on economic impact or quantity, courts were to determine infringement on
an unpredictable, impressionistic basis."). See generally Jeffrey D. Coulter, Computers,
Copyright and Substantial Similarity: The Test Reconsidered, 14 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 47 (1995), for the history and development of the substantial
similarity test.
322 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.6[B], at 296.
323 See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 ("The test for similarity of ideas is ... a factual one, to
be decided by the trier of fact.").
324 See id. at 1164-65; Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 ("The proper criterion on [the misappropriation] issue is not an analytic or other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they appear on paper or in the judgment of trained musicians."); LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.6[B], at 296 ("Under the ordinary observer.., test, neither expert
testimony, detailed analysis, nor dissection are a proper basis for determining whether
works are substantially similar.").
325 LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 9.6[B], at 296.

326 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
327 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (subject matter of copyright).
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also that the embodiment of that persona on film is "sufficiently
permanent.., to permit it to be perceived [or] reproduced for a
period of more than transitory duration."32' 8 Such persona is there' within the meaning, and falls within
fore "fixed"329
the scope, of the
Copyright Act.
Furthermore, granting exclusive rights to exploit such a persona is consistent with the existing copyright scheme. Under the
scheme, authors are rewarded with copyright only if their works
are "original.""33 A persona that looks and feels substantially like
the actor's human persona would hardly be original. 31 Such a per-

sona, therefore, does not merit copyright protection, regardless of
the amount of effort writers have put into creating that persona.3 32
In Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,333 the Su-

preme Court made clear that the "sweat of the brow" theory-the
notion that industrious collection of facts is rewarded with copyright protection 334--has no place in the existing copyright
scheme. 335 Because the writers failed to make the personality of

the character substantially different from the actor's human persona, they must bear "the penalty... for marking [their character]
Id. § 101 (definition of fixation).
Id. § 102(a) (subject matter of copyright).
"Originality is a constitutional requirement." Feist, 499 U.S. at 346; see also ROSE,
supra note 302, at 2 ("Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique individual who
creates something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labors."); Goldstein,
supra note 82, at 216 ("[Copyright] implies a floor for investment by requiring that, to be
protected, a work be original with the author and not copied from some other source.");
Hamilton, Dormant Copyright Clause, supra note 87, at 21 ("Copyright protection is not a
cattle prod to get the herd moving but rather a gold star for achievement that marks an
original work with approval."); Litman, The Public Domain, supra note 104, at 967
("[Clopyright's paradigm of authorship credits the author with bringing something wholly
new into the world."); id. at 975 ("[O]riginality determines the boundaries of copyright.").
For discussions of Feist and the constitutional originality requirement, see generally
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation,17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885 (1992);
Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992); Russ
VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Russ VerSteeg,
Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and the Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 549 (1995).
331 See discussion supra Part Il.A; cf. Berman & Boxer, supra note 207, at 330-31
("[T]he more 'human' the character is who is depicted in the movie or television work, the
less likely that he or she will be found to be in the event of copyright infringement, sufficiently delineated to merit separate copyright protection.").
332 See Hamilton, Appropriation Art, supra note 246, at 112 ("The individual who
spends years of effort or, more appropriately in this day of pop culture oligopoly, millions
of dollars, to produce a work that is not original gets no copyright protection.").
333 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
334 Id. at 352 (describing the "sweat of the brow" theory as "the underlying notion that
copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts").
335 See id. at 352-54 (rejecting the "sweat of the brow" theory).
328
329
330
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' i.e., losing copyright protection. By contrast, a
too indistinctly,"336
persona that is substantially different from the actor's human persona is not only original but is a new expression that is of social
value. Thus, it is consistent with the Copyright Act and the constitutional goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
' to reward with copyright protection those writers that have
Arts"337
created a new and original persona.
To illustrate the "fictional persona" test, consider, for example, "Norm Peterson" from Cheers. Under the "fictional persona"
test, a robot that displayed "Norm" but not George Wendt's facial
features exploited a fictional persona if an average lay observer
can recognize a personality that is substantially different from
Wendt's own human persona. Thus, the robot would exploit a fictional persona if an average lay observer made the following observation at trial:
[T]here's no confusing Norm Peterson with George Wendt, the
actor who portrays him. Instead of a suit and tie with a slept-in
look, Wendt wears an Air Jordan T-shirt, shorts and running
shoes. His calves are solid, and he moves like the natural athlete he is. This bears repeating: George Wendt is a lifelong
jock. Granted, a large one.33
In fact, there is no question that "Norm" is a fictional persona,339
for the actor admitted so himself.3" Thus, in Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 4 since the robots have different names342 and facial features, 43 the robots exploit the fictional personae of "Norm" and
"Cliff." Based on the preemption analysis in Part III, the actors'
state claims are therefore preempted by the Copyright Act, 3" and
Paramount Pictures should have prevailed.
This conclusion on the preemption issue is different from that

Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
338 Jim Harmon, "Norm!" Close-Up: George Wendt, RUNNER'S WORLD, Dec. 1991, at
43,43.
339 See Kaplan & Namuth, supra note 194, at 54 ("Of course... Wendt presumably ha[s
a] real li[f]e apart from [his] NBC persona[].").
340 See Behind the Scenes at Cheers, supra note 128, at 57 (statement of George Wendt)
("I'm like Norm in one respect.... Beer is my life.... Every year I have to gain seventyfive pounds to play Norm. I put it on before we start the shows and I take it off after
we've finished."); Bricker, supra note 129, at 23 (statement of George Wendt) ("I always
play a jolly fat guy. I wanted to play a scuzzy character for a change.").
341 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
342 The robots were called Bob and Hank, instead of "Norm" and "Cliff' (or "George"
and "John").
343 See Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811.
344 See supra Part III.B.
336

337
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of the Ninth Circuit in Wendt. Declining to address the issue,34 the
court held that, as long as the restaurants "sought to appropriate
[the actors'] likenesses for their own advantage,"341 the actors'
likenesses could still be appropriated even though the names and
"facial features [of the robots] are totally different."3 47 However,
under the "fictional persona" test, courts would not reach this
holding. If the robots displayed none of the actors' human personae, they exploited only the audiovisual characters' fictional personae. 34 The actors' state claims would therefore be preempted.
Since the restaurants had obtained a license from Paramount Pictures to run Cheers-themed bars,349 the restaurants should have
been able to display "Norm" and "Cliff" in their bars.
Although most audiovisual characters can be easily dealt with,
because these characters were created specifically for the audiovisual works and were therefore substantially different from the
actors' human personae, there are still some hard cases in which
"there will be factual difficulty in deciding whether defendant's use
primarily identifies the actor or identifies a role associated with the
35 The "Jerry Seinfeld" character from Seinfeld, for examactor.""
ple, presents one of these hard cases.
Consider the following account:
[W]asn't Jerry just playing Jerry on Seinfeld all those years?
Real Jerry was a thin, immature, neatnik comedian from New
York. Ditto TV Jerry. Real Jerry loves cereal and Superman,
same as you-know-who. Real Jerry, 44 years old, has never
married. TV Jerry-bachelor to the bone.
Yet there are differences between the man and his Must
See alter ego. TV Jerry drove a Saab and most likely made a
tidy five-figure income. Real Jerry owns some 25 Porsches and
probably spends five figures on car wax. Then there's his disposition. TV Jerry can be a smug, self-absorbed fellow (remember
when he drugged a date so he could play with her vintage
toys?). But Real Jerry, by most accounts, is the opposite: loyal,
generous and a pretty decent guy.35'
Obviously, there are many overlapping characteristics between the
345 See Wendt I, Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1995)
("At the outset, we wish to make it clear that this is not a preemption case.").
346 Wendt II, 125 F.3d at 811.
347 Id.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 123-31.
349 See Wendt 1,1995 WL 115571, at *3.
350 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 35, § 4.13[E], at 4-81.
351 PartSerious Artist, supra note 141, at 26.
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fictional persona of the "Jerry Seinfeld" character and Jerry Seinfeld's human persona, since the actor was supposed to play himself
in the television show. Nonetheless, there are still many differences between the two personae. If the producer could introduce
substantial evidence documenting the difference between the created persona352 and the actor's human persona, the producer would
have a strong property claim over the fictional persona of the
"Jerry Seinfeld" character. After all, the distinction between human persona and fictional persona is fact-based and thus depends
on factual evidence introduced at trial.
CONCLUSION

In this Information Age, where copying technologies are becoming better and cheaper every day,353 copyright protection provides a very important incentive to induce authors to create and
disseminate works of social value. 4 As new computer digital
technology allows simulations of real people-including deceased
celebrities-and the proliferation of new multimedia derivative
works incorporating preexisting copyrighted materials,355 control
over commercial exploitation of images becomes a very important
question. Thus, courts should be careful to accord images the exact amount of protection Congress has meticulously balanced.356
352 Cf. Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 1998) ("[The characters in Seinfeld] and events spring from the imagination of
Seinfeld's authors .. ");Mike Flaherty & Mary K. Schilling, The Seinfeld Chronicles: An
Obsessive-Compulsive Viewer's Guide to All 148 Episodes, ENT. WKLY., May 30, 1997, at
24, 24 ("You have a lot of brilliant minds examining a thought or ethical question from
every possible angle." (referring to writing Seinfeld)).
353
See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1005 (1994) ("Photocopying machines at one time threatened to turn every individual into a mass publisher, but cyberspace seems actually to have achieved that distinction in a way that photocopying never really did."); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808-33 (1995) (arguing that the production and reproduction costs of information have been greatly reduced by the Internet).
354 See LEAFFER, supra note 97, § 1.9, at 18 ("Without effective protection for authors,
the supply of works of authorship may diminish such that we will be left with sophisticated
copying techniques but with nothing worth copying.").
355 See McCarthy, supra note 19, at 146-47 (stating that the "rotoscoping" process allows Diet Coke to insert images of deceased actors into its television advertisements);
Beer & Pekowsky, supra note 35 (stating that "reanimation technology" allows wellknown figures to be featured in creative works); Lasky & Weingrad, supra note 194
("Multimedia works frequently use preexisting stock photographs or film clips."). For example, in the movie Forrest Gump, the images of actor Tom Hanks are inserted into old
footage of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
356 See HOWELL, supra note 5, at 174 ("[N]o court should lightly dismiss characters in
the popular media as too trivial to be deserving of careful reasoning under one or more

414

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:355

By providing the "fictional persona" test, which distinguishes fictional persona from human persona, this Note attempts to provide
a tool through which courts can resolve conflicts between actors
and copyright holders in a manner consistent with the Copyright
Act.
Since state commercial laws are "peculiarly susceptible to disruption by preemption issues '357 and business planners who run the
entertainment industry are "particularly concerned with the pre' those laws, uncertainty on the predictability and stability of"358
emption issue increases both the cost of contracting359 and the litigation expense.360 A consistent resolution of the preemption issue,
therefore, not only preserves scarce, valuable resources but also
"promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"36' a constitutional goal cherished by the Framers.
Peter K. Yu**

legal theory.").
357 Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative Process and Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
BUS. LAW. 437, 438 (1993).
358 Id.
359 See id. ("[U]ncertainty as to the applicable law raises the costs of contracting because lawyers attempt to comply with the competing regimes rather than risk a faulty
transaction."); see also Leaffer, supra note 12, at 454 ("Buyers and sellers should be able
to know exactly what intangible property is being transferred and how much it is worth if
the property right is relatively certain in dimension and scope.").
360 See id. ("Uncertainty [in the preemption issue] adds directly to the costs of transacting business .... ).
361 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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